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Redefining Government's Role in
Health Care: Is a Dose of
Competition What the Doctor
Should Order?
James F. Blumstein* and Frank A. Sloan**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Active political debate about the proper role of government in
the health sector is nothing new. For almost seventy years, the
question of the federal government's role in facilitating the public's
access to medical services. has been on the national political
agenda. A major proposal for national health insurance, for
example, was part of Theodore Roosevelt's Bull Moose platform in
1912.1 Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman also
promoted a form of comprehensive national health insurance. After a hiatus of about twenty years, the issue arose again during the
New Frontier of President John F. Kennedy, albeit in revised and
modified form, and in the Great Society of President Lyndon B.
Johnson. Many proponents of national health insurance, however,
considered the enactment of Medicare 2 and Medicaid3 in 1965 only
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. Senior Research Associate,
Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies. B.A., 1966, Yale College; M.A., 1970, Yale
University; LL.B., 1970, Yale Law School.
** Professor of Economics, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics and Business Administration. Director of Health Policy Center of the Vanderbilt Institute for Public
Policy Studies. A.B., 1964, Oberlin College; Ph.D., 1969, Harvard University.
1. See Marmor, Feder & Holahan, Introduction, in NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE:
CONFLICTrING GOALS AND POLICY CHOICES 1 (J. Feder, J. Holahan & T. Marmor eds. 1980).

2.

Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1801, 79 Stat 286 (codi-
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a partial victory-a beginning and not a culmination. Federal
financing of medical services for the poor and the elderly was
viewed as a first step toward a strategic phase-in of broader comprehensive national health insurance coverage.4
Throughout the 1970s, the two major political parties espoused some form of national health insurance.5 Faced with a fiscal
squeeze, however, the Carter Administration gave national health
insurance a relatively low priority.
The political movement for comprehensive national health insurance rests on an ideological commitment that the federal government should underwrite the cost of providing universal access
to medical services. The objective is essentially redistributive in
nature: equitable concerns for the disadvantaged loom as the major
focus. The selective expansion of coverage to encompass those
identified as needy and worthy, but only those so identified, is
anathema to those who traditionally support broad national health
insurance. These proponents would contend that a universal and
comprehensive program is necessary to avoid a dual system of
medical care delivery-one for the poor and another for the
nonpoor. Advocates of a universal program would, in effect, compel
the nonpoor to fund and participate in a governmentally sponsored
program designed to benefit the poor so that the medical care system operated under government auspices would not be confined to
lower income persons and, implicitly, stigmatized as welfare
medicine of lower quality and lower status.
The access gap between rich and poor-a disparity that underlay much of the political initiative for national health insurance-has been narrowed in recent years7 at least partly because of
Medicaid and Medicare. Overall expenditures on medical services
have escalated dramatically during the past two decades and ocfled at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1976)).
3. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121, 79 Stat 286 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976)).
4. See generally T. MARMOR & J. MARMOR, TE POLITICS OF MEDICARE (1973).

5. See generally Marmor, Feder & Holahan, supra note 1, at 2-7.
6.

See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., HEALTH POLICY: THE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA 75A

(1980).
7.

See L. ADAY, R. ANDERSEN & G. FLEmiNG, HEALTH CARE INTHE U.S.: EQUITABLE FOR

WHOM? (1980); K. DAVIS & C. SCHOEN, HEALTH AND THE WAR ON POVERTY A TN YEAR

APPRAISAL 41 (1978); F. SLOAN & J. BENTKOVER, ACCESS TO AMBULATORY CARE AND THE U.S.
ECONOMY 147 (1979); Davis & Reynolds, The Impact of Medicare and Medicaid on Access
to Medical Care, in THE ROLE OF HEALTH INSUANCE IN THE HEALTH SERVICES SECTOR 391,
392 (R. Rosett ed. 1976).
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cupy an increasingly large component of our national income.8 Few
people would now maintain that aggregate medical care spending
is substantially too low.9 To the contrary, skeptics point out that
structural institutional relationships in the medical sector encourage ever-expanding medical expenditures." Coupled with a
growing awareness of the importance of nonmedical factors in the
promotion of health, 1 this fact has led to general questioning
whether individuals and society collectively are getting their
money's worth from surging medical services expenditures.
Pragmatically, factors such as lifestyle have assumed a more visible
role in affecting health status.12 Politically, the sense that illness is
fortuitous has been challenged, which in turn has suggested a more
tight-fisted response to claims for more munificent redistributive
programs.1 3 Moreover, other pressing claims on public budgets and
cries for tax relief have recently emerged. 14 These nonhealth demands make less money available for public programs with strong
redistributional orientations.
In the political arena, the result at both the state and the federal level has been to focus on problems of containing both the
price of and aggregate expenditures on health services, adding a
new perspective and a sense of balance to earlier public policy concerns that focused almost exclusively on the goals of access and
quality. As the magnitude of federal 5s expenditures has come
under scrutiny, and as the public has come to believe that the federal government must gain control over aggregate expenditure
levels, those interested in the management of public funds have
expressed concern about the so-called uncontrollable items in the
8.

See Gibson, NationalHealth Expenditures, 1979, 2 HEALTH

CARE FINANCING

REV. 1

(1980).
9. But see Lunde, Health in the United States, 453 ANNALs 28, 29-30 (1981) (Survey
shows that in 1977 over half the people in the United States thought the government "was
spending too little on health," although the percentage of those who so believed fell between
1974 and 1977).
10. See, e.g., Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. Rav. 6, 13-30 (1975).
11. See, e.g., Blumstein & Zubkoff, Perspectives on Government Policy in the Health
Sector, 51 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q.: HEALTH & Soc'Y 395, 399-400 (1973).
12. See Vaupel, Early Death:An American Tragedy, LAw & CoN'TEMP. PROB., Autumn
1976, at 73, 83-87, 97-110.
13. See Knowles, The Responsibility of the Individual,DAEDALUS, Winter 1977, at 57,
59-60.
14. The Reagan Administration's commitment to augment expenditures for national
defense is perhaps the most signal example.
15. Although selected states have been active in cost containment, to a large degree
the states are at the mercy of policies implemented at the federal level.
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federal budget-the various government entitlement programs.
These programs reduce governmental budgetary flexibility because
by their nature they are not required to run the political gauntlet
and compete for annual appropriations. By establishing broad programs of entitlements,"6 Congress imposes on itself the obligation
to fund social welfare programs at levels that are beyond effective
budgetary control. Because of the inflexibility and political isolation-even political untouchability-that these entitlement programs have enjoyed in the past, they are now subject to intensive
review and reappraisal. In the health field, major and ever-escalating entitlement commitments in the Medicare and Medicaid programs have become focal points of controversy, suggesting that
even more expansive national health insurance commitments
would exacerbate the problem of uncontrollable federal
expenditures.
As government's fiscal obligations under Medicare and Medicaid have increased, the perception that prices and aggregate costs
in the health sector are a significant public policy problem has
been reinforced. These perceptions, when coupled with a growing
institutionalist critique 17 focusing on the lack of proper incentives
in the health arena,18 have prompted a new type of public policy
awareness in the health field. While concerns about access still exist, the new focus seems to emphasize the establishment of proper
market incentives with the dual objectives of conserving public
funds and curbing inflation in health care costs. Prompted by general criticism of economic regulation, 9 health policy analysts have
begun to think of the health sector more as an economic system,
subject to economic principles.2 0 The assumption that the laws of
16. Entitlements are built into statutory programs. Beneficiaries who qualify under
program criteria are entitled to receive benefits, and Congress is obligated to appropriate
adequate funding. As a result, the legislative branch makes no budgetary decision at the
front end of the process; rather, funding levels are determined after the fact on the basis of
how many individuals qualify under the statutory or regulatory provisions of the program.
As a result of proliferating entitlement programs, Congress, through its budgetary authorization and appropriation process, loses considerable control over aggregate levels of
expenditure.
17. See Blumstein, The New Institutionalism, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1981, § E, at 21,
col. 2.
18. See Havighurst, Blumstein & Bovbjerg, Strategies in Underwriting the Costs of
CatastrophicDisease, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROS., Autumn 1976, at 122, 188-95.
19. See generally Posner, Regulatory Aspects of NationalHealth InsurancePlans, 39
U. CHI. L. Rv. 1 (1971).
20. See generally J. NEwHousE, THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL CARE 49-66 (1978); ComPETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR: PAST, PRESENT, AND FuTuRE (W. Greenberg ed. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as COMPErIION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR]; Report of the Task Force
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economics do not apply to the health arena is no longer blindly
accepted.2 1 Health policy analysts are now much more prone to
shift the burden of proof to those who claim that the market does
not, cannot, or should not function properly in the health sector.2 2
With the 1979 amendments to the health planning legislation, 3
Congress took an important step toward accepting this new market-oriented approach, reflecting a major and fundamental turnabout in its way of thinking about health policy issues.2 4
Market-oriented critics focus on institutional reform and redesign as a means of restoring an appropriate incentive structure
within the health sector. 2 5 Under that approach, governmental action follows from the identification of institutional misfunction,2 6
and the preferred remedy is to perfect the institution by appropriately limited governmental intervention.2 7 There is a normative
sense that decentralized decisionmaking in a fair system is preferable to politically determined collective choice on the grounds of
both individual freedom and allocative efficiency. There is also a
prudential sense that government's direct allocative role in the
health arena should be minimized because of the heavy overlay of
symbolism involved in tradeoffs when life and health are at stake.2
The risk of symbolic blackmal2 " is excessive; that is, government
may find itself supporting expansive expenditures because it is unable to engage openly in tough interpersonal valuations. 0 Thus, for
normative and prudential reasons, market proponents tend to be
on the Marketplace, in 1 NATIONAL COPMSSION ON THE COST OF MEDICAL CARE, 1976-77, at
23-45 (1978).
21.

See, e.g., J. MEYER, HEALTH CARE COST INCREASES (1979); Havighurst & Hack-

barth, Competition and Health Care: Planning for Deregulation,REGULATION, May/June
1980, at 39.
22. See Blumstein & Sloan, Health Planningand Regulation Through Certificate of
Need: An Overview, 1978 UTAH L. REv. 3; Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra note 11, at 400-01;
Blumstein & Zubkoff, Public Choice in Health:Problems, Politics and Perspectives on Formulating National Health Policy, 4 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 382 (1979).
23. Health Planning and Resources Development Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-79, 93 Stat. 592 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 300k-2(b) (1976)).
24. See Havighurat & Hackbarth, supra note 21, at 43-46.
25. See generally Havighurst, ControllingHealth Care Costs: Strengthening the Private Sector's Hand, 1 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 471 (1977).
26. See Blum tein & Zubkoff, supra note 22, at 383-84.
27. Id. See also Blumstein, supra note 17.
28. See Havighurst, Blumstein & Bovbjerg, supra note 18, at 129-31, 140-45.
29. Blumstein, Constitutional Perspectives on Governmental Decisions Affecting
Human Life and Health, LAw & CoNTEmiP. PROB., Autumn 1976, at 231, 303. See also id. at
252 ("institutional blackmail").
30. See Havighurst, supra note 25, at 491.
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cautious about new government initiatives, even those designed to
contain costs. Instead, the focus is on procedural or institutional
analysis, diagnosis, and redesign.3 1
This Article examines the market-oriented approach, describing what it is and what its rationale is. It then focuses on the problem of equity within the market system. In addition, the Article
analyzes and evaluates prior regulatory experiences and examines
the emerging directions of health policy. Finally, the Article considers selective developments from the perspective of the competitive alternative.
H.

THE MARKET-ORIENTED APPROACH

The choice between competition and regulation is a choice between imperfect systems. It is not realistic to expect that the medical marketplace conforms to all the textbook preconditions for a
perfectly competitive situation, and it is unreasonable to assume
that abstract aspirations for a regulatory system can in practice be
fully realized. Technical state-of-the-art limitations hamper regulation," and because regulation is a political mode of social ordering,
regulation and regulatory outcomes are to a considerable extent influenced by uncertain and sometimes unforeseeable political forces.
In the real world, then, the choice is not between competition and
regulation in either pure form.
Moreover, the realistic range of public choice does not reflect a
total commitment to one or another system of social ordering. The
regulatory environment virtually always allows for some forms of
competition. Under certain circumstances, however, that type of
competition may be counterproductive rather than constructive.3s
Similarly, the competitive approach does not rule out some forms
of governmental intervention." Indeed, certain forms of procompetitive regulation may be necessary for the proper functioning of
31. See, e.g., NATIONAL CHAM3ER FOUNDATION, A NATIONAL HEALTH CMe SMATEGY:
How BusNEss CAN STIMULATE A CoParrv HEALTH CAmm SySzM (1978).

32. See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 22, at 15-16; Bovbjerg, Problems and Prospects for Health Planning: The Importance of Incentives, Standards, and Procedures in
Certificate of Need, 1978 UTAH L. REv. 83, 93-97. See generally Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure:Mismatches,Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARv. L. Rzv. 549,
584-609 (1979); Schuck, Regulation: Asking the Right Questions, NAT'L J., April 28, 1979, at
711-17; Wolf, A Theory of Nonmarket Failure:Framework for Implementation Analysis, 22
J.L. & ECON. 107-39 (1979).
33. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 32, at 573-74.
34.

See, e.g., A. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN 78-82 (1980).
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markets.3 5 Truth-in-labeling regulation is an example. Other areas,

such as emergency medicine, public health, and catastrophic illness, also suggest an appropriate and constructive governmental
presence. 3 Under the competitive approach the government will
continue to have a role in financing medical care for the needy, for
persons who cannot reasonably be expected to bear the full cost of
medical services, and for those for whom society feels a moral or
political obligation and a financial responsibility.
In sum, the relevant public choice issues will concentrate on
where to draw the line along a continuum of public-private responsibility. It is therefore not productive to think of the public policy
issues in health as balancing one pristine world view against another equally pure approach. Rather, it is more useful to start from
the proposition that there may well be deviations from the competitive model in the health sector, but that those who seek to involve
government should bear the burden of establishing the existence of
either an institutional misfunction or an equitable problem in need
of redress. 87 Even then, proposed remedies should be aimed at
perfecting the market before replacing it with a command-andcontrol regulatory apparatus.as When redistributive goals of access
are pursued, they too should, to the extent possible, be promoted
by an approach that builds on, not conflicts with, an unrestricted
market emphasizing incentives and consumer choice.
A.

The Market Approach: Economic Preconditions

The market system relies on decentralized, private decisionmakers-producers and consumers-for allocative choices.39
When the parties to a transaction are the sole or primary interested persons, society in general can safely assume a noninterventionist "low profile" unless it has reason to believe that the transaction is unfairly structured.40 Such unfairness could occur, for
35. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 212-423 infra.
36. Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra note 11, at 421-26.
37. See Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra note 22, at 385-87, 403-05.
38. This terminology was introduced by Charles L. Schultze, the Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisors under President Carter. See C. SCHuLTzE, THE PUBLIC USE OF
PRVATE INTEREST (1977).
39. See J. HRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (1980). For a discussion from
a health care perspective, see P. FELDSTEN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 405-22 (1979). See
also Zubkoff & Blumstein, The Medical Marketplace: Health Policy Formulation in Consideration of Economic Structure, in 2 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TE COST OF MEDICAL
CARE, 1976-77, at 73, 92-93 (1978).
40. The traditional grounds for governmental intervention in the market are: (1) ex-
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example, if a consumer is improperly informed4 1 or incapable of
making an informed choice. 42 It could also occur when, for a number of reasons, a consumer's choice is artificially circumscribed by
either public or private regulations that narrow the range of options 44-for example, when a consumer would choose to engage a
dental hygienist independently (and presumably at a price lower
than that charged by a hygienist who works in a dentist's office)
but a state's law prohibits consumer choice by barring that form of
service delivery.
Since one justification for decentralized decisionmaking is the
desirability of allowing private firms and households to choose
among available alternatives, an essential precondition to the market approach is that the consumer's ability to choose exist in fact
and without substantial distortion. A critical element of any market-oriented system is that private decisionmakers have some significant stake in forgoing consumption. One of the remarkable
strengths of private marketplace choice is that decisionmakers select in an either/or rather than a yes/no context.44 Given a budget
constraint, a private decisionmaker knows that the choice of more
of X inevitably means less of Y. Balancing present against future
wants and needs, a private decisionmaker is well situated to make
efficient tradeoff decisions based on a distinct set of preferences.
The widespread existence of third-party payment relieves patients and providers from the perceived constraint of scarce reternalities, (2) public goods, (3) monopoly, and (4) other market imperfections. See J.
HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 39, at 520-51.

In the absence of significant externalities, government can usually rely on the parties to
a transaction to take responsibility for the outcome of their own negotiations. Exceptions
exist when the parties have grossly uneven bargaining leverage or when the outcomes are so
one-sided that, because of notions of equity, government might step into the negotiation
process.
41. See J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 20, at 54-55. See generally Note, RestructuringInformed Consent: Legal Therapy for theDoctor-PatientRelationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533,
1535-41 (1970).
42. See generally Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. Rzv.
413, 415 & nn.10-11, 439-53. See also Ingelfinger, Informed (but Uneducated) Consent, 287
NEw ENG. J. MED. 465 (1972); Oppenheim, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 11
CLEv.-MAR. L. Rlv. 249, 261 (1962).
43. See generally Cohen, Professional Licensure, OrganizationalBehavior, and the

Public Interest, 51 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q.: HELTH & Soc'Y 73 (1973); Kissam, Physician's Assistant and Nurse PractitionerLaws: A Study of Health Law Reform, 24 KAN. L.
Rv. 1 (1975).
44. See Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 10, at 33-38, 52-58. See generally A. AL&
(1979).

CHIAN

W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDINATION, AND CONTROL
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sources.4 5 At the physician-patient level of decisionmaking both
parties face inexorable pressures toward a spare-no-expense approach to medical practice. Apprehensive and uncertain, patients
seek and may well demand the best available care. This instinct
can be indulged in a world of third-party coverage since patients'
out-of-pocket expenses are kept relatively low and the potential effect of a single episode of illness on the overall experience of any
group of insureds is minimal. Only in the aggregate do such individual decisions have an impact on group rates. The pool of insurance funds is much like a commons." Individual decisionmakers
suffer very directly when they decide not to use collectively pooled
resources-for example, by forgoing an additional test or procedure-but the savings derived from that decision do not accrue
specifically to the individual who made it. Rather, they are shared
with all other users of the collective resource. As a result, the incentive to conserve is minimal.
A fee-for-service setting relieves providers of their fiduciary
responsibility to weigh the cost effectiveness of any test or procedure they recommend.' 7 Realizing their patients claim on a common insurance fund, providers can rationalize prescribing tests or
procedures that, while somewhat beneficial, may be of low priority.' A prudent person, absent insurance, might elect to forgo
these tests or procedures if he could recapture and reallocate the
amount thereby saved. In short, circumstances in which a decisionmaker faces a choice of only yes or no-that is, to consume or
not to consume medical services-and does not stand to benefit
directly from a tough-minded decision to forgo some services reinforce the preexisting inclination to purchase the most elaborate
services modern medicine has to offer." Only when private decisionmakers-patients, providers, or institutions-can recapture
and reallocate (R & R) resources derived from economizing can an
45.

See McClure, The Medical CareSystem Under NationalHealth Insurance: Four

Models, 1 J. HiATH POL., POL'Y & L. 22 (1976).

46. See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); Hiatt, Protecting the Medical Commons: Who is Responsible?, 293 NEw ENG. J. Man. 235 (1975).
47. See A. ENTHOvN, supra note 34, at 10. See also Havighurst & Blumstein, supra

note 10, at 13-15.
48. See generally Blumstein, Inflation and Quality: The Case of PSROs, in HEALTH: A
ViCrIM OR CAUSE OF INFLATION? 245, 270 (M. Zubkoff ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as

HEALTH]; Havighurst & Blurnstein, supra note 10, at 15-20.
49. See M. PAULY, DoCroRs AND THEm WORKSHOPS: ECONOMC MODELS OF PHYSICIAN
BEHAVIOR 1-15, 43-63 (1980).
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effective decentralized system emerge.50 In the absence of R & R,
decisions will not be seen as either/or. Rather, they will be perceived as yes/no, and decisionmakers will follow their biases toward a higher style of care, which in turn will create a ready market for whatever new technology can make even a marginal
contribution to improved diagnosis or treatment.
The R & R principle, which plays a crucial role in any responsible market-oriented system, conflicts with current modes of
third-party payment plans and proposals. Developed as a means of
alleviating uncertainty by pooling risks, health insurance plans,
both private and public, solve the access problem by distorting the
decisionmaking structure in the medical care marketplace. No serious proponent of a market-oriented strategy can, therefore, be unconcerned about the structure of public and private insurance programs, about the federal tax incentives that encourage broad and
deep insurance coverage,51 and about the lack of incentives for cost
consciousness in the current system.52
The market-oriented strategy assumes that, given the opportunity to choose between alternatives and the ability to benefit
tangibly from forgoing the consumption of medical services, many
consumers (or, when appropriate, physicians on behalf of their patients)53 will decide to forgo some medical services that would be
marginally beneficial because other, nonmedical priorities will take
precedence." The market-oriented strategy views health as an instrumental rather than an ultimate value-a means to an end, not
an end itself. 5 Thus, the desirability of trading off health for other
50.

See A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 34, at 16; H. FRECH & P. GINSBURG, PUBLIC INSUR-

ANCE IN PRIVATE MEDICAL MARKETS: SOME PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 21-22

(1978).
51.
52.

A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 34, at 19-21.
See H. FRECH & P. GINSBURG, supra note 50, at 17-33; J. KRIZAY & A. WILSON, THE

18 (1974).
53. Three actors can limit costs-consumers, providers, or government. See McClure,
supra note 45, at 26. Proponents of regulatory approaches emphasize cost control by government. See text accompanying notes 93-211 infra. Proponents of market strategies disagree
on whether primary reliance should be placed on consumers or providers. Compare Seidman, Income-Related Consumer Cost Sharing: A Strategy for the Health Sector, in NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: WHAT Now, WHAT LATER, WHAT NEVER? 307 (M. Pauly ed.
1980) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: WHAT Now] (advocating consumer
cost sharing) with A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 34, at 32-36 (advocating reliance on HMOs and
physician cost consciousness). See generally Havighurst & Hackbarth, Private Cost Containment, 300 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1298 (1979).
54. See V. FUCHS, WHO SHALL Liva? HEALTH, ECONOMICS, AND SOCILL CHOICE 17-19
(1974).
55. See Zubkoff & Blumstein, supra note 39, at 73-74.
PATIENT AS CONSUMER: HEALTH CARE FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES
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benefits is assumed and can be achieved only when the opportunity for R & R exists.
From this discussion, then, it should be apparent that the
market-oriented strategy requires a reformist approach, a restructuring of institutions in the medical sector to restore health to that
marketplace. It is inappropriate to consider this a "conservative"
approach. Indeed, its threat to entrenched and concentrated structural medical interests"6 is its major political drawback. Rather,
this approach is reformist and institutionalist, if not radical, in
character; it is premised on the essential desirability of restoring
proper private decisionmaking incentives to the medical
marketplace.
B. The Market Approach: Political Pitfalls and Preconditions
The reformist agenda of the market-oriented strategy suffers
from the lack of a discernible political constituency. For one set of
proponents of comprehensive national health insurance, the use of
financial disincentives as a mechanism for allocating medical care
resources is ideologically anathema. To the extent that one believes
that money should never matter in the health arena and that total
equality in the utilization of medical services should exist, the market alternative is likely to be unacceptable. Choice and financial
constraints inevitably mean that some persons with high incomes
will be able to afford more health care than persons with lower
incomes. This does not necessarily mean that all disparities must
be permitted, however. Society could well decide that equal access
should prevail with respect to certain basic services, allowing a disparity for only certain designated "extras" and ensuring a socially
desirable, minimum level of care for low income groups. Finally, to
the extent that one believes that income distribution should be unaffected by any illness-that is, ex post not just ex ante income
should be a source of governmental concern 5 7-- the freedom of
choice of the market will not be attractive.
These ideological positions, all too familiar a part of the health
policy debate, make institutional redesign very difficult politically.
If one believes in restoring incentives for economizing and in relying on private decisionmakers, one must assume the existence and
56. See generally R. ALFORD, HEALTH CARE POLITICS: IDEOLOGICAL AND INTEREST
GROUP BARRIERS TO REFORM 1-21 (1975).
57. See Fein, On Achieving Access and Equity in Health Care, in ECONOMIC ASPECTS
OF HEALTH CARE

23 (J. McKinlay ed. 1973).
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desirability of some differences in preferences; therefore, one can
anticipate different decisions by similarly situated individuals
about how much to spend on medical care. A political ideology
that requires outcome equality and rejects as coercive the use of
financial constraints on decisionmaking will not support a market
strategy.
In addition to access egalitarians, providers and unions are
likely political adversaries of a market strategy. Physicians do not
necessarily welcome the prospects of competition and consumer
choice. Although physician associations often support notions of
competition, true reform would clearly leave some physicians substantially worse off financially. Moreover, certain market-oriented
reforms threaten traditional prerogatives of the profession-in particular, pro-market reform would seriously undermine the physician's role as the benevolent father figure in control of the patient
and his course of treatment.58 A true competitive system would require physicians to disclose more information to patients and to
acknowledge the patient as the ultimate decisionmaker. Such sharing of authority and responsibility, however, conflicts with traditional professional preferences for autonomy.59
Much of the medical profession's objection to commercialization of medical practice60 will also reflect an instinctive, if often
subconscious, concern about the effects of competition on style of
practice and incomes. It is only reasonable that the profession prefers a situation in which medical judgments alone prevail and in
which physicians feel at liberty to diagnose and treat on the basis
of medical necessity, unsullied by the messy business of making
treatment recommendations based at least in part on judgments of
cost effectiveness. Certainly, economic considerations make an already taxing responsibility that much more complex. Any profession would prefer to have the authority to spend money from a
58.

See Note, supra note 41, at 1535-41.

59. Under any competitive system, the consumer must make at least some choices in
which extra quantity and/or quality involves an out-of-pocket outlay. See, e.g., Evans, Physician Based Group Insurance:A Proposalfor Medical Cost Control, 302 NEw ENG. J. MED.

1280 (1980).
60. As the medical marketplace is permitted or encouraged to emulate other economic
sectors, the charge of commercialism is inevitable. This charge was the fear of professionals
who sought to retain the ban on professional advertising. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S.
350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976). Some manifestations of a freer market system in medical services will undoubtedly appear unprofessional and exploitative, especially at the outset, but standards of
taste and decency may well emerge as excesses of the hard-sell turn away prospective
consumers.
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common fund for its patients' well-being; the incidental aggrandizement of its own members' incomes is an added, if unspoken,
consideration. Surely, then, physicians are not natural political allies for those promoting competition. 1
For physicians to feel comfortable with the competitive approach, they must believe that the alternatives are less acceptable.
Physicians must be persuaded that they cannot have it both ways;
comprehensive third-party financing cannot exist without concomitant oversight or control. Increasing public cost consciousness may
lead to cutbacks in publicly financed programs such as Medicaid
and Medicare. During the 1970s some states instituted a variety of
cutbacks in Medicaid programs,s and similar efforts with respect
to Medicare are foreseeable. State regulatory efforts now aimed at
institutional capital investments and hospital rate-setting might, in
the future, be focused more directly on physician fees, modes of
practice, recertification, and the like.
The competitive approach, on the other hand, is ideologically
compatible with physicians' traditional commitment to an entrepreneurial, pluralistic health care delivery system. e3 Direct government intervention is less likely to occur, or, if it does occur, it
probably would be less intrusive in a competitive system. Moreover, increased sharing of information and responsibility for decisionmaking with patients could well have a salutary effect on a
physician's malpractice liability." If a properly informed patient
takes or shares responsibility for a decision, courts may be more
willing to impose an added measure of risk on the patient. This
doctrinal development in the malpractice field would likely be favorably received by those doctors who may now practice medicine
defensively out of apprehensiveness about malpractice liability.
Institutional providers also are unlikely political allies of the
market advocates"-first, because they fear competition; and sec61. See R. ALFORD, supra note 56, at 13-17, 191, 194-200.
62. On the general question of Medicaid cutbacks, see Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A StructuralApproach, 88 YALE L.J. 243, 286-303 (1978).
63. See Enthoven, Health Care Cost Control Through Incentives and Competition:
Consumer-Choice Health Plan, in Socio-EcONoMc IssuEs oF HI"TH 1979, at 23, 35 (G.
Misek ed. 1979).
64. Richard Epstein's skepticism about the usefulness of the doctrine of informed consent rests on his belief that patient participation in decisionmaking will not have a significant effect on the judicially established standard of care. Presumably, should the courts give
weight to the element of patient participation, that would be a step in the right direction
from Epstein's perspective. See Epstein, Medical Malpractice:The Case for Contract,1976
Am. B. FOUNDATxON RES. J. 87, 119-28, 126 n.80.

65.

R. ALFORD, supra note 56, at 191, 200-09. See also Havighurst, Regulation of
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ond, because competitive pricing will prevent them from subsidizing programs they regard as worthwhile.
Nonprofit corporations dominate the institutional sector, and,
at the same time, fear competition from for-profit entities-in the
hospital and nursing home fields and from emerging prepaid-group
practices. Thus, it is hardly likely that these institutions will embrace the competitive alternative. Indeed, the nonprofit hospital
industry took the initiative in seeking regulation, always a warning
signal that an entrenched industry is seeking government support
in its effort to exclude competitors.
A complicating factor is the close link between teaching and
patient care functions. 6 This problem is particularly acute with regard to hospitals that are affiliated with medical schools, institutions with considerable influence in medical politics. Flexibility to
cross-subsidize helps administrators to make ends meet and still
allow "unprofitable" services to flourish if "interesting" for teaching or research purposes or if otherwise in the institution's or the
public's general interest. In a competitive world, the market will
make it more difficult for administrators to use cross-subsidization
to achieve policy goals that are usually unarticulated and developed without any clear pattern of accountability. 7 The prospect of
diminishing opportunities for cross-subsidization makes the
procompetitive approach even less attractive to nonprofit institutions than would otherwise be the case."8
Because cross-subsidization might well be substantially eliminated by competition,"' the perspective of provider institutions will
likely depend on their perception of political reality.70 A cap on
Health Facilitiesand Services by "Certificateof Need", 59 VA. L. REv. 1143, 1148-51, 115355, 1178-88 (1973).
66. See J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 20, at 26-32; Zubkoff & Blumstein, supra note 40, at
109. See also Sloan, Patient Care Reimbursement: Implicationsfor Medical Education and
Physician Distribution,in MEDICAL EDUCATION FINANCING: POLICY ANALYSES AND OPTIONS
FOR THE 1980's, at 57, 73-81 (J. Hadley ed. 1980).

67.

See Havighurst, supra note 65, at 1188-94; Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2

BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sc. 22 (1971). See also Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the

Hospital Industry?, 93 HARv.L. REv. 1416, 1437-41, 1465-71 (1980) (describing and criticizing the "elitist" role of nonprofit hospitals when engaging in cross-subsidization).
68. Proponents of competition must also address the problem of financing medical education in teaching hospitals-institutions that engage in the "joint production" of patient
care and physician training. See J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 20, at 26-32.
69. Cf. Clark, supra note 67, at 1471-87 (suggesting legal changes to reduce "undesirable cross-subsidization [that] permeates nonprofit hospitals," id. at 1480).
70. For example, the American Hospital Association in 1968 supported certificate-ofneed regulation in response to concerns about escalating hospital costs. See Havighurst,
supra note 65, at 1151. One surmises that industry support for regulation stemmed in part

1981]

A DOSE OF COMPETITION

863

revenues, such as that which the Carter Administration's cost containment proposal had embodied,7 1 would be less attractive to provider institutions as a long-run solution than the introduction of a
more competitive system. If escalating hospital prices and aggregate costs continue to provoke investigation by policymakers into
potentially harsh regulatory approaches, institutional providers
may well conclude they can live with a decentralized competitive
system in which the threat of direct governmental restrictions
would be somewhat reduced.
A third group involved in the health care system-unions and
other representatives of employees-is also unlikely to support the
competitive approach unless certain concerns are addressed. After
all, one of the major structural biases that marketeers typically
target is the existing tax subsidy for employer-financed health insurance coverage. 2 Unions may well smell a "take away" in the
move to rescind or modify current tax subsidies that support important components of hard-won fringe benefit packages.7
For unions and employee representatives to acquiesce to the
competitive approach, they must be assured that reintroduction of
incentives for economizing will not result in an overall reduction of
their net welfare.7 4 Thus, it seems clear that employee representatives will not embrace any proposal that merely takes away an existing tax inducement for purchasing high style medical insurance.
Such a move would have significant distributive consequences, and
one can safely assume that those whose tax benefit is at risk would
vigorously oppose withdrawal of that benefit. Reform of the system
in order to restore proper incentives and to achieve improved efficiency can be made more attractive to employee groups if there are
no negative distributive consequences. Once that issue is eliminated, the incentives technique could be made to appeal to unions
and engender their support.
At present, a union and a company typically negotiate an
overall medical insurance package. Federal tax law allows an emfrom its confidence that the result of regulation would not be unfavorable for the regulated
hospitals. See id. at 1178-88.
71. See Blunstein & Sloan, supra note 22, at 30-32; Dunn & Lefkowitz, The Hospital
Cost ContainmentAct of 1977: An Analysis of the Administration'sProposal,in HosPrrAL
COST CONTAINMENT. SELECTED NoTEs FOR FUTURE POLICY 166 (M. Zubkoff, I. Raskin & R.
Hanft eds. 1978).
72. See, e.g., Havighurst, Blumstein & Bovbjerg, supra note 18, at 189-90.
73. See Ginzberg, Competition and Cost Containment, 303 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1112,
1113 (1980).
74. See id.
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ployer to deduct all insurance costs, but income is not imputed to
employees for this benefit.75 The tax law thus creates a clear incentive for the union to seek a broad and deep insurance policy, which
minimizes out-of-pocket expenditures of employees, paid in aftertax dollars. 7 1 For the union leader, a political official, the elimination or reduction of irritating copayments, deductibles, or other internal limits is a distinct political plus. In turn, the employee likely
faces very little financial constraint up to a certain maximum when
illness occurs. Moreover, if the administration of a plan is rigorous,
with claims reduced or disallowed, employees direct their hostility
at the company, which is perceived as trying to save money at the
worker's expense.
One way to secure political support from employee groups is
to assure those groups a central role in purchasing medical insurance plans for their members. No cutback in tax subsidy is necessary, but the business expense deduction for the purchase of medical insurance could be limited to situations in which the employer
specified in advance a fixed sum per employee up to a certain maximum as the employer's contribution to the health package and an
employee group or employees individually selected a particular insurance plan and oversaw its administration. Under that arrangement, the union would decide whether to allocate the entire per
employee sum to medical insurance or whether to economize by
purchasing a less generous plan and to use the residual funds, not
subject to full taxation, for some other worthy union activity. Acting as surrogate for its membership, a union would have an incentive to economize because the R & R principle" obtains. Union
members, through internal politically representative procedures,
could influence union decisionmaking about priorities. Since union
members would benefit from tight-fisted administration, the union
would be encouraged to manage the plan prudently, but not excessively niggardly, because of the its accountability to its
membership.
Finally, it is important to realize that, even if the specific concerns of particular interest groups can be allayed, the most fundamental political barrier to competition is ideological. The belief
75. See A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 34, at 19-21.
76. Unions have shown an unmistakable preference for complete coverage and for the
Blues, which, at least traditionally, have been more likely to offer such coverage. See, e.g., R.
MUNTs, BARGAINING FOR HEALTH: LABOR UNIONS, HEALTH INSURANCE, AND MEDICAL CARE

131-43 (1967).
77.

See text accompanying notes 47-55 supra.
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that money should not matter in allocating medical resources is
not uncommon in our society. Its corollary that people and institutions should not profit from illness reflects the queasiness many
observers feel at what they decry as the emerging "medical-industrial complex.178 This uneasiness about money and profit is perpetuated by our use of language. 9 In the medical sector physicians
typically are not "compensated" or "paid" by the third-party carriers; rather, they are "reimbursed," a misnomer if one ever existed.
Reimbursement suggests repayment or restitution for an expenditure or a loss incurred. It denies the obvious, that money is being
earned for providing a service. Someone is indeed earning an income, and probably a handsome one, for performing a highly valued service that requires skill. The reimbursement terminology,
however, dulls our sensitivity to what is for some an indelicate reality-namely, that in medical care, as elsewhere, priorities must
be established, choices made, and, at times, increments of quality
forgone because of resource constraints."
The ideological position is difficult to overcome directly. Perhaps an indirect approach, however, can succeed. There does seem
to be a growing awareness that equality of access may be an unattainable and even an undesirable goal.8 1 Leveling up would require
such a staggering commitment of resources that other public priorities would unduly suffer; leveling down would promote gross
inefficiency, lower quality, achieve a dubious sort of equity in
which waiting time would be the main resource allocator, and
threaten fundamental precepts of freedom by barring individual
expenditures for health above some arbitrary limit set by government. Indeed, as a practical matter, it is doubtful that any such
governmental program could be enforced at all. As in the case of
Prohibition, respect for law would diminish, and physician moonlighting would substitute for the rural moonshining of the Prohibition era.
78.

(1980).

See Relman, The New Medical-IndustrialComplex, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 963

79. For discussions of the importance of language in shaping health policy issues, see
Blum tein & Zubkoff, supra note 22, at 385-86 (distinguishing between "maldistribution"
and "disparity"); Havighurst, Blumstein & Bovbjerg, supra note 18, at 158-62 (discussing
the definition of death); Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 10, at 31-33 (suggesting an
economic dimension to the concept of overutilization).
80. See R. ANDREANO & B. WEISBROD, AMERICAN HEALTH POLICY: PERSPECTIvES AND
CHOICES (1974); V. FuCHS, supra note 54, at 3-29.
81. See, e.g., V. FucHS, supra note 54, at 7 (" 'Highest quality care for all' is 'pie in the
sky.' "). See also Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra note 11, at 407-12.
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It does seem self-evident by now that the goal of equal utilization of medical services is an unrealistic and probably unwarranted
policy aspiration.82 It serves more as a symbolic myth founded in
the "right to health" rhetoric of the 1960s.8 3 Once it is accepted
that some disparities are inevitable and even desirable, the purely
ideological position should be defused. If the notion of "adequacy"
can be substituted for "equality,

'8 4

the toughest ideological hurdle

will have been leapt. This is not to say that consensus will miraculously emerge about what constitutes an acceptable level of "adequacy," but at least the more versus less debate can proceed along
customary political lines without the inhibiting intrusion of rigid
ideology. Unless and until adequacy or some similar notion is
accepted and equal utilization is no longer an ideological precondition to acceptability, a market-oriented strategy will not be politically viable. Similarly, unless health is perceived as an instrumental, not an ultimate, value,85 the possibility of tradeoffs is remote.
Without acceptance of the need for and desirability of tradeoffs,
the market-oriented approach is not likely to succeed.86
C. The Market Approach: The Issue of Equity
The above discussion of economic and political preconditions
for a market-oriented strategy did not directly consider a traditionally major health policy issue-the problem of equity.8 7 The
introductory discussion noted that issues of access and quality
dominated the health policy dialogue until the 1970s. The current
emphasis on constraining rising prices and aggregate costs reflects
a basic modification in the political agenda in the health field.
The procompetitive critique of the health sector stresses the
bias toward overutilization of services and excessive commitment
of resources characteristic of the equality of access approach. 88 The
goal is to restore a system in which decisionmakers face appropriate incentives and share in the benefits and burdens that arise
82. See Havighurst, supra note 25, at 491.
83. See Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 10, at 6-7.
84. See Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra note 11, at 411; Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra note
22, at 405. See generally Michelnan, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7 (1969).
85. See Zubkoff & Blumstein, supra note 39, at 73-74.
86. See H. FRECH & P. GINSBURG, supra note 50, at 21-22.
87. See Callahan, Health and Society: Some Ethical Imperatives, DAEDALus, Winter
1977, at 23. See also Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra note 11, at 407-12; Blumstein & Zubkoff,
supra note 22, at 384-87, 403-05.
88. See Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 10, at 9-20.
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from their own choices.
The competitive approach, therefore, is designed to improve
efficiency in the allocation of resources. It does not directly address
the question of equity of access,8 9 except that it rejects the ideological stances that (1) health is an ultimate good and therefore not
subject to tradeoffs90 and (2) equal utilization of medical services is
an absolute equitable imperative, 1 unrelated to private preferences and different private resource constraints. Beyond that, the
market-oriented strategy makes no specific claim about the proper
eligibility criteria or level of medical services that society should
provide to worthy and needy persons. It takes no position on what
degree of redistributive munificence is proper in the medical services field,92 although it assumes that an adequate level of services
will be provided for those who cannot otherwise afford to pay for
care from their own resources.
Given the magnitude of overall expenditures for medical care,
the system cannot be designed solely, or even primarily, to solve
the access problem of indigents. The structure established must set
in place a well-designed system, including proper incentives for the
various decisionmakers. Instead of piggybacking the nonpoor onto
a plan designed to care for the needy, the competitive approach
provides resources for the needy to enable them to participate
responsibly in a system designed for everyone.
HI.

Tim REGULATORY APPROACH

Ironically, the market approach in the health field requires a
reformist political agenda because the predominant mode of governmental intervention in this sector has been government regulation. The market-oriented strategy therefore must undo and redo a
great deal of existing governmental intervention if it is to be fairly
tried.
Traditionally, intervention is justified as a means of overcoming some form of market failure or of achieving some set of equita89. See Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra note 22, at 387. See generally V. FuCHS, supra
note 54, at 14, 22-23, 127-42.
90. See Callahan, supra note 87, at 25-26; Zubkoff & Blumstein, supra note 39, at 7374.
91. See Havighurst, supra note 25, at 491.
92. The following has been suggested as a normative benchmark: "[W]hat provident
individuals would choose to spend if they knew the value of each service and could design
their own insurance coverage, carefully balancing the benefits and costs against other uses
for their money." Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 10, at 15.
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ble objectives.9 3 Existing governmental regulatory and financial
support programs are supported on one or both of these bases. For
example, the Hill-Burton program, enacted in 1946 and designed
to promote hospital construction, was the federal government's
first major health initiative. 4 The program's rationale, as expressed in the legislation itself and in the hearings, was that existing hospital facilities were inadequate. Additionally, there was
the implicit belief that the private sector would not generate sufficient new facilities unless the federal government directly subsidized the growth. By 1974, Congress had concluded that there was
an oversupply of hospital beds and other hospital-based capital facilities and equipment. It responded by requiring states to develop
certificate-of-need (CON) programs that scrutinize the necessity
for all hospital capital expenditures above a certain level, even
when no direct support is involved. 5 Indeed, in the same legislation Congress enacted a new hospital construction program. No
funds have been appropriated under it, however, or under HillBurton, its predecessor, since its enactment.
Similarly, in 1965 Congress enacted the Medicare and Medicaid programs, providing medical care for the elderly and the categorically needy. Unlike the Hill-Burton approach, which relied on
direct support for hospital supply expansion, Medicare and Medicaid provide financial support on the demand side. Federal dollars
allow the needy and the elderly to purchase medical services in an
existing system.
The increase in overall demand for medical services caused by
Medicare and Medicaid was not only predictable, but was the very
objective of the legislation. The magnitude of the increase was underestimated, however, and by 1972 conflicting pressures emerged.
In that year Medicare eligibility was significantly expanded to include kidney patients and the disabled.9 At the same time,
93. See, e.g., Davis, The FederalRole in the Health Care Market, in 2 NATIONAL ComMISSION ON THE COST OF MEDICAL CARE, 1976-77, at 201-05 (1978). More recently, commentators have viewed regulation as providing a mechanism for reorienting provider incentives
in ways consistent with cost containment. See Altman & Weiner, Regulation as Second
Best, in COMPErION IN THE HEATH CARE SECTOR, supra note 20, at 339.
94. See generally Rose, Federal Regulation of Services to the Poor under the HillBurton Act: Realities and Pitfalls, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 168 (1975); Note, The Hill-Burton Act,
1946-1980: Asynchrony in the Delivery of Health Care to the Poor, 39 MD. L. REv. 316
(1979); Note, Due Processfor Hill-Burton Assisted Facilities,32 VAND. L. REv. 1469 (1979).
95. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 22, at 19-23.
96. See Rettig, The Policy Debate on Patient Care Financingfor Victims of EndStage Renal Disease, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Autumn 1976, at 196.
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though, Congress enacted a number of cost-containment programs,
including the Professional Standards Review Organization (PSRO)
program designed to review the necessity of medical services provided by or in institutions.9 7 The story of the PSRO program's legislative history and postenactment interpretation is told elsewhere;98 what is germane here is that, seven years after expanding
demand by enacting Medicare and Medicaid, Congress intervened
again to combat the unintended consequences of its munificence.
Thus, governmental intervention to satisfy certain equity or
access objectives can create market imperfections that in turn justify further intervention. CON legislation, designed to forestall
wasteful duplication, is deemed necessary because of the prevalence of third-party financing and the dominance of nonprofit institutions in the hospital industry, two distinctive characteristics of
the health care marketplace. Governmental programs have helped
shape that marketplace. Tax subsidies encourage broad and deep
private medical insurance coverage, major third-party government
insurance programs (Medicare and Medicaid) account for nearly
fifty percent" of third-party payments for hospital services, and
major federal subsidies for the construction of nonprofit hospitals
(Hill-Burton) give nonprofits a competitive edge in the hospital
industry.
Not all deviations from the competitive model are governmentally inspired, of course. Genuine problems exist with respect to
consumer information and understanding. In some situations, especially in the case of emergency care, it is not realistic to expect
patients to make careful on-the-spot medical judgments and sound
economic tradeoffs. 10 0 The traditional assumptions, however, that
have justified governmental intervention are no longer accepted
uncritically. It is still true that providers exercise great influence
over patients' utilization decisions and that patients often are uninterested in or incapable of being educated about qualitative matters and risk factors, but this does not necessarily mean that regulatory control is therefore required. These inadequacies could
easily be corrected by educating patients or providing them with
some form of informational intermediary, rather than using them
97.

See Blumstein, The Role of PSROs in Hospital Cost Containment, in HosPrAL

CosT CONTAINMENT, supra note 71, at 461.

98. Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 10, at 38-45.
99. See Gibson, supra note 8,at 25.
100. See R. CAMPBELL, ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND PUBLIC
stein & Zubkoff, supra note 11, at 421-23.
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as an excuse for rejecting the market altogether.
Nonetheless, the perceived existence of irremediable market
imperfections, irrespective of their source, has been the justification for governmental intervention. Much regulation now exists as
a result, and it is appropriate to consider what the experience has
been in those regulatory programs. This review will focus on regulatory activity centered on the hospital, the hub of the modem
medical care delivery system.
Expenditures on hospital services represent the largest single
component of health care expenditures. In 1979, for example,
about forty percent'0 1 of total expenditures on personal health services went to hospitals. Both expenditures per unit and total expenditures per hospital service have escalated more dramatically
than any other major category of health services. For over a decade
third-party coverage has almost completely funded hospital care.102
Regulation is seen as a method of offsetting overutilization and excess capacity, attributable to insurance and physician generated
demand. 03
The major hospital regulatory efforts have been the following:
(1) controls over hospital facilities and services through health
planning and CON; (2) utilization controls, accompanied by concerns for quality assurance, under the PSRO program; and (3) at
the state level, direct regulation of hospital rates and/or revenues.
Each will be considered in turn.
A. Facilities and Services Regulation
1. The Regulatory Programs
State CON laws, federally mandated since 1974, and the section 1122 review program are the major forms of hospital facilities
and services regulation. Section 1122 is a federal program adopted
by states on a voluntary basis.10 4 It seeks to limit hospital capital
expenditures by withdrawing Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements for nonapproved capital outlays. Under the program, statedesignated planning agencies review capital expenditures exceeding federally-set guidelines, as well as changes in bed census and
changes in services offered. Absent regulatory approval, hospital
101. See Gibson, supra note 8, at 13.
102. See id. at 25 (over 90% of hospital care is financed by third parties).
103. See Altman & Weiner, supra note 93, at 341.
104. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 93-603, 86 Stat. 1453 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-1 (1976 & Supp. II 1978)).
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expenditures attributable to unapproved capital projects are not
considered legitimate costs for reimbursement under Medicare and
Medicaid. 10 5
Section 1122 operates by establishing a financial disincentive
for unapproved hospital capital spending. Hospitals can, however,
proceed with construction if they can secure reimbursement from
nonfederal sources. The CON program, on the other hand, is a
command-and-control regulatory program that is intended to stop
duplication of hospital facilities and services. Under CON, statedesignated agencies applying federally-established minimum standards must approve entry of new hospitals, expansion and/or modernization of existing hospital plants, and, in certain cases, provision of new services or termination of existing services.
Under the mandate of the federal health planning legislation,
virtually all states have enacted CON laws. 0 8 Although federal
guidelines establish parameters for state CON legislation, states
vary in such matters as comprehensiveness and review and appeals
procedures.1 0 7 Coverage must extend to health care facilities, including both hospitals and nursing homes, but not to doctors' offices. Under revised federal regulations, state CON programs must
review the addition by a health care facility of a health service if it
is either "associated with" a capital expenditure of any amount or
if it "entails annual operating costs" of at least $75,000. In addition, a CON agency must review a facility's decision to terminate a
health service if that termination is "associated" with a capital expenditure in any amount.1 0 8
CON is a reactive form of regulation; the regulated institution,
rather than the agency, takes the initiative in proposing a particular capital expenditure. 0 9 With very few exceptions, state CON
programs lack the authority to require decertification of existing
105. See generally H. HY
(1977).
106. See U.S. DEPARTMENT

, HEALTH REGULATION: CERTIFICATE OF NEED AND 1122

OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, BuREAu OF HEALTH
PLANNING, DATES OF CERTIFICATE OF NEED ENACTMENT AND 1122 AGREEMENT (1980) [hereinafter cited as DATES OF CON ENACTMENT AND 1122 AGREEMENT].

107. See CHAYET & SONNENREICH,

P.C., CERTIFICATE OF NEED: AN EXPANDING REGULAFALL 1978, at 30-274 (1978). For a discussion of distributional
objectives and accomplishments in the context of CON programs, see POLICY ANALYSIS INC.
TORY CONCEPT, SUPPLEMENT,

& URBAN SYSTEMS RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, INC., EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF CERTIFICATE OF NEED PROGRAMS: FINAL REPORT (1980) (prepared for the U.S. Department of

Health & Human Services under Contract No. 231-77-0114).
108. 45 Fed. Reg. 69,740, 69,747 (1980) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 123.404(a)(3)).

109. See generally Bovbjerg, supra note 32; Kopit, Krill & Bonnie, HospitalDecertification: Legitimate Regulation or a Taking of Private Property?, 1978 UTAH L. REv. 179.
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facilities and services. In fact, the revised federal regulations actually constrain hospitals' ability to terminate a service, to redistribute beds among categories, or to relocate beds from one site to
another. 110
Areawide planning agencies (health systems agencies or HSAs)
do have authority to develop a health systems plan (HSP), which
may influence providers who propose new construction or modernization. The agencies, however, lack enforcement tools; all they can
do is refuse to approve projects that do not comply with the HSP.
Even then areawide agencies only recommend decisions to statewide agencies, which make the ultimate decision and may respond
to a political constituency beyond the purview of the areawide
agency.
Although CON does not explicitly repeal the section 1122 program, CON review makes separate review under section 1122 redundant. Theoretically, CON review could authorize an institution
to expand or modernize while section 1122 review refused federal
reimbursement under Medicare or Medicaid for that capital expenditure. As a practical matter, however, both decisions are likely
to be the same because they are based on the same factors of need.
As a result, many states have now dropped their section 1122 programs."" Accordingly, this consideration of the effectiveness of facilities and services regulation will concentrate on the state CON
programs.
2.

The Effectiveness of the Certificate-of-Need Program

A major study of CON programs covering the years 1968-1972
concluded that they reduced bed expansion.12 Despite this reduction plant assets per bed increased during the study period, apparently because controls on fixed equipment other than beds were
less stringent.118 Coupled with the findings of another inquiry,1 4
this study indicates that the CON program has had no net impact
on total hospital investment (plant assets). Although these studies
110. 45 Fed. Reg. 69,740, 69,747 (1980) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 123.404(a)(2)).
111. All except 9 states had adopted a § 1122 program at one time or another by 1979.
By late 1979, however, 15 states had terminated or were terminating their programs. See
DATES OF CON ENACTMENT AND 1122 AGREEMENT, supra note 106, at 4.
112. See D. SALKEvER& T. BICE, Hosprr^L CERTIFICATE OF NmD CONTROLS: IMPACT ON
INVESTMENT, CosTs, AND USE 53-73 (1979).
113.

Id.

114. See Hellinger, ProspectiveReimbursement through Budget Review: New Jersey,
Rhode Island, and Western Pennsylvania, 13 INQUIRY 309 (1976).
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of early CON efforts may be criticized because they sought to measure impact before implementation efforts could realistically be
evaluated, a more recent study of hospital regulation supports
these findings. 11 5 Distinguishing CON programs on the basis of
program age, this recent study found that in the year preceding the
introduction of the CON program, a 1.4 percent increase occurred
in bed growth, due greatly to anticipation that such growth would
be restricted in the future by CON. 11 6 This increase was not offset
on average by reductions in bed growth as the program matured.
In addition, CON seemed to increase aggregate expenditure levels
by raising hospital demand for labor inputs, which are beyond the
direct control of CON programs. Other research, using data as recent as 1978, has confirmed this study.11 7 Overall, those who have
investigated the effectiveness of mature CON efforts conclude that
the program's vintage has no measurable effect on hospital costs.
Even with regard to bed growth alone, the program seems only
marginally effective. In sum, the consensus in the research community is that CON has not succeeded in cost containment.
B.

Utilization-QualityRegulation
1. The PSRO Program

Hospital certification has long required utilization review
(UR), a self-policing mechanism by which hospitals gauge both the
technical quality and the medical necessity of services delivered by
their medical staff. UR encompasses a broad range of activities,
including review of the necessity for admission, periodic recertification of the necessity for continuation of a stay, and review of specific services delivered. 118
In 1972, Congress mandated the establishment of PSROs as a
mechanism for requiring peer review of utilization of hospital services paid for by Medicare and Medicaid. 11 Congress enacted the
115. See F. SLOAN & B. STEINWALD, INSURANCE, REGULATION, AND HOsPrrAL Cos 91121 (1980).
116. Id. at 169.
117. - See POLICY ANALYSIS INC. & URaAN SYSTEMS RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, INC.,
supra note 107. See also Sloan, Regulation and the Rising Cost of Hospital Care, in REv.
ECON. & STATISTICS (forthcoming).

118. On the origins and rationale of utilization control, see TECHNICAL WORK GROUP
ON HEI TH CARE COSTS, RISING MEDICAL COSTS IN MICHIGAN: THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
AND THE EFFCTIVENESS OF CURREr CONTROLS 340-42 (1973).
119. See J. BLUM, P. GERTmAN & J. RABINow, PSROs AND THE LAW 12-17 (1977); U.S.
HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS REvIEw ORGANIZATION
1979 PROGRAM EVALUATION (1979).
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PSRO program out of its belief that traditional UR programs then
existing under Medicare and Medicaid were ineffective in curtailing the unnecessary use of services provided by or in
institutions.
Under the PSRO legislation, no Medicare or Medicaid funds
can be disbursed if a PSRO disapproves the provision of service.
PSROs are organized geographically, covering areas as large as an
entire state or as small as a few zip codes within a single city. They
are composed of physicians practicing in the area and are open to
any physician who seeks membership.
By establishing guidelines for practice, including ranges of acceptable variance around specified norms-for example, a range of
permitted lengths of stay for a given illness-a PSRO engages in a
form of rulemaking or standard setting. In addition, the PSRO has
ultimate responsibility for applying those guidelines in specific
cases, an essentially adjudicatory function. In practice, the PSRO
delegates much adjudicatory review to the hospital itself under
terms set out in the statute. Thus, it is somewhat misleading to
consider a PSRO as an external peer review entity.
The PSRO delegation of responsibility for UR back to the institution suggests that hospitals have much the same autonomy
they had under UR prior to enactment of the PSRO program.
PSROs do oversee delegated hospital review, however, and can revoke a hospital's delegated reviewer status if the institution does
not perform its review function satisfactorily. Moreover, the practice guidelines established by PSROs are likely to be influenced by
physicians' sense that the PSRO program should deemphasize cost
containment and emphasize quality assurance as the overriding
goal. The prevalence of delegated review and the physicians'
success in turning PSRO into primarily a quality assurance program led to rather accurate early predictions that PSRO would not
be a cost-containment program at all but rather would be an "effective. . . political instrument for increasing, not reducing, health
'120
expenditures.

2.

The Effectiveness of the PSRO Program
Very few large-scale studies have been conducted on the effects of UR on hospital expenditures. A thorough evaluation of the
Experimental Medical Care Review Organization (EMCRO) program in New Mexico during 1971-1975, a PSRO prototype, yielded
120.

See Blumstein, supra note 48, at 286.
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no significant evidence that EMCRO reduced rates of hospital admission, length of stay, or hospital days of care of the Medicaid
population. 2 1 One subsequent analysis of the effects of UR and
PSRO activities nationwide found no effect on levels of, or changes
in, Medicare utilization rates. 122 A federal government study, how-

ever, did find that PSROs have reduced hospitalized days of Medicare beneficiaries by 1.7 percent. 2 ' The study showed wide regional disparities in PSRO effectiveness. In the South, for example,
the statistical analysis suggests that PSROs have raised levels of
hospital utilization by Medicare beneficiaries by more than a trivial amount.1 4 In the West, on the other hand, no effect was detected. If PSRO effectiveness is region-specific, it would be useful
5
12
to know why.

The ultimate conclusion about the effectiveness of PSROs
seems to be that, if they have any effect at all, they may cut hospitalized days by a very modest amount in some areas of the country. PSROs do not, on the other hand, measurably affect hospital
costs per admission or per diem. Moreover, the program itself creates costs. Thus, any cost savings are outweighed by the costs of
administration. 1 6 The Reagan Administration seems to have concluded that the PSRO program is a likely target for extinction because it is not justified on cost effectiveness grounds."1 7 Of course,
PSROs do have a quality assurance mission, and undoubtedly
some would attempt to justify their continued existence on that
basis. Evidence on that claim, however, is speculative, and there is
indeed a basis for questioning whether the quality assurance objective should serve as the saving rationale for continued support of
the PSRO program.
C. Rate-Revenue Regulation
A final type of hospital regulatory effort involves direct control
of hospital charges and revenues. Regulatory bodies may place lim121.

Steinwald & Sloan, Regulatory Approaches to Hospital Cost Containment: A

Synthesis of the Empirical Evidence, in HEALTH CARE-PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, GOVERNMENT
REGULATION, OR MARKETS (M. Olson ed.) (forthcoming) [hereinafter cited as HEALTH CARE].
122.

Id.

123. See U.S. HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, supra note 119, at xii.
124. Id.
125. For a comprehensive review of an earlier Health Care Financing Administration
study of PSROs, see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECT OF PSROs ON HEALTH
CARE COSTS: CURRENT FINDINGS AND FUTURE EVALUATION (1979).
126. Id.
127. See [1981] 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH), Report Letter #318, at 1.
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its on levels and rates of increase in charges; they may also set
limits on levels and rates of increase in revenues (input expenditures). The most important such program attempted to date by the
federal government was the wage and price controls of the Nixon
Administration's Economic Stabilization Program (ESP). At the
state level, prospective reimbursement (PR) programs, which establish ceilings on amounts hospitals receive from participating
third-party payors, have been the most important initiative.
1.

The Economic Stabilization Program

Under ESP the federal government controlled wages and
prices. Somewhat later, the federal government also restricted reimbursement costs by third-party payors. Annual growth of hospital revenues because of price was limited to a maximum of six percent, based on "allowable" increases in costs. Thus, certain cost
increases were "nonallowable" and could not justify an increase in
prices. 128 "In practice . . . the effective limitation on price increases was nearer to 4.3 percent"1 29 because of a very low level of
allowable nonlabor cost increases. The emphasis of ESP on price
rather than expenditure increases was not what many health care
experts would have preferred.
Descriptive studies show that hospital cost increases were reduced several percentage points during the ESP period.13 0 Although early analytical studies of the ESP show little or no effect
on hospital costs,1 31 a more recent analytical study is consistent
with the descriptive evidence.13 2 Overall, it appears that ESP did
reduce hospital costs. It is somewhat risky, however, to project future effectiveness on the basis of ESP because of the program's
brief existence and because of the many political and administrative problems that beset it.
2.

Prospective Reimbursement

Several states have initiated PR programs. Under PR an ex128. See Ginsburg, Inflation and the Economic Stabilization Program, in HEALTH,
supra note 48, at 31, 38.
129. Id. at 38.
130. See Altman & Eichenholz, Inflation in the Health Industry-Causesand Cures,
in HEALTH, supra note 48, at 7, 20-22. See also F. SLOAN & B. STENWALD, supra note 115.
131. See Ginsburg, Impact of the Economic Stabilization Programon Hospitals: An
Analysis with Aggregate Data, in HosprrAL COST CoNTAmmENT, supra note 71, at 293. See
also F. SLOAN & B. STEiNWALD, supra note 115, at 105-07.
132. See Sloan, supra note 117.
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ternal authority sets or approves hospital charges, third-party payment rates, and total hospital revenue. Decisions are made in advance of the year to which they apply. Hospitals are paid according
to these prospectively determined rates rather than on the basis of
actual costs incurred. Moreover, hospitals are placed at risk for differences between prospectively determined revenues and actual
costs."' Unlike cost-based reimbursement in which costs at least
theoretically generate revenue, 3 PR theoretically encourages hospitals to be concerned with the cost implication of changes in
quantity, quality, style of care, scope of services, and efficiency because third-party payors under PR do not cover overruns.1 3 5
While the various state PR programs share many elements,
two major differences are notable: (1) type of review (formula or
budget-review method); (2) rate versus total revenue regulation.
Formula review involves periodic recomputation of new prospective rates on the basis of such factors as the general inflation rate
3 6 Formula PR
and the type of hospital."
involves little direct interaction between hospitals and the rate-setting authority.'3 7 Although a formula may be arbitrary in some circumstances, the distancing of agency from hospital suggests that the agency's formula
can be viewed abstractly, in statistical terms, and therefore has
some prospect for success in containing costs.
Under budget review PR, the hospital develops a budget for
the prospective year, which is reviewed by the PR authority. Items
in the budget deemed unnecessary or excessive by the agency are
eliminated or reduced. Hospitals are generally given the opportunity to negotiate and appeal budget-reducing decisions. Once the
final budget has been approved, the PR authority establishes a
payment rate covering the hospital's budgeted costs. Because this
method permits maximum recognition of individual hospital characteristics, hospitals often prefer it to the formula method.1 3 8 By
133. See Dowling, Prospective Reimbursement of Hospitals, 11 INQUIRY 163, 163-64
(1974).
134. For descriptions of cost and charge-based reimbursement, see Tekolste &
Sigmond, How Should Blue Cross Reimburse Hospitals?,MOD. HosprrALS, July 1963, at 90.
For a concise legal history of reimbursement trends, see Weiner, "Reasonable Cost" Reimbursement for Inpatient Hospital Services Under Medicare and Medicaid: The Emergence
of Public Control, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 1 (1977).
135.
136.

See Dowling, supra note 133, at 164.
New York relies most extensively on this method. See U.S. HEALTH CARE FINANC-

VII HEALTH CARE FINANCING GRANTS AND CONTRACTS REPORT.- NATIoNAL HosPrrAL RATE-SETTING STUDY 1-2 (1980).
ING ADMINISTRATION,

137. Id.
138. See Worthington, Prospective Reimbursement of Hospitals to Promote Effi-
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focusing attention on the fine detail of hospital management, the
budget-review approach seems to give hospitals an advantage in
the negotiation process since it is difficult for the PR agency to
demand cuts that affect identifiable services and possibly identifiable individuals.
To date, only two of the eight mandatory state PR programs
regulate hospital revenue.13 9 Setting prices for particular hospital
services is more popular. To the extent that hospitals can generate
extra units of service to compensate for low, regulated prices, the
latter approach is less constraining.
The mandatory rate-setting programs of eight states represent
the most stringent rate-revenue efforts at the state or local levels.
Descriptive evidence suggests that increases in expense per admission, expense per patient day, and total expenses were considerably lower in 1977 and 1978 in states with mandated rate-setting
than for the rest of the United States. Total hospital expenses in
the eight "mandatory" states increased 9.7 and 8.6 percent for
1976-1977 and 1977-1978, respectively, in contrast with increases
of 15.8 and 14.0 percent for the other states and the District of
Columbia. 14 0 Because these patterns are only evident for 19761978, and not for earlier years, the authors of one study concluded
that these programs first became effective several years after initial
141
implementation.
More comprehensive hospital cost studies, using regression
analysis on state-by-state aggregates of hospital data, reach nearly
the same conclusion. The Congressional Budget Office found that
mandatory state rate-setting reduced hospital expenditures per
capita by about three percentage points over the period 19761978.142 A study by one of the authors of this Article distinguished
new state programs, those less than three years old, from mature
ones, those three or more years old. The study found that new
ciency: New Jersey, 13 INQUIRY 302 (1976). Sometimes budget and formula approaches are
combined. A hospital's rate may initially be set by budget review and be updated by
formula. Likewise, with a formula, a hospital seeking legal remedy may be subject to budget
review.
139. Maryland and Washington regulate hospital revenue. See U.S. HEALTH CARE FiNANCING ADMINISTRATION, I & VIII HE.TH CARE FINANCING GRANs AND CONrRACTS RzPORT: NATIONAL HosPITAL RATE-SETTING STUDY (1980).

140. See U.S. HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATIONS IN HEALTH CARE FINANCING 1978-1979, at 26 (1979).
141. See Biles, Scbramm & Atkinson, Hospital Cost Inflation Under State Rate-Setting Programs, 303 NEW ENG. J. MEo. 664 (1980).

142. See
(1979).

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CONTROLLING RISING HoSPrrAL COSTS

94-96
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state rate-setting programs did not affect hospital costs, but that
mature programs lowered both levels and growth rates of hospital
costs per admission and per diem. These estimates imply that if all
payors were subject to mature state rate-setting, equilibrium cost
reductions would range from seven to twenty percent.14 s Coelen
and Sullivan have reported somewhat smaller statistically significant negative effects. 144 Their study, like other recent analyses of
hospital rate-setting, found that program effectiveness is evident
only for the late 1970s. Earlier research extending through only
1975 found little or no rate-setting program impact on hospital
cost dependent variables. 4 5
Although research results support the notion that mandatory
rate-setting has achieved its objective, for several reasons these results should not be viewed uncritically. First, programs may have
produced certain wasteful distortions as hospitals have looked for
ways to circumvent binding regulatory constraints. For example,
hospitals under ESP or tough PR programs may admit more patients whose conditions require relatively short stays and/or relatively few resources per patient-day. Second, the apparent failure
of some regulatory programs and the at best limited success of
others raise a political bureaucratic question about why and how
some states are able to develop cost-reducing programs.
Mandatory PR programs are overrepresented in the Northeast.
One Western state, Colorado, eliminated PR in early 1980 because
of industry opposition and a general antiregulatory environment.
This raises a question whether the experiences of such states as
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York can be replicated elsewhere. Third, even in states in which rate-setting programs eventually have controlled hospital costs, no effects were evident on average within the first two or three years. In this sense,
tough rate-setting programs are not a short-run panacea. Fourth,
controls that successfully curb hospital costs may also eventually
force certain hospitals into bankruptcy. If they do, one must wonder how this will affect such other goals as access and how the regulatory and political processes will respond. For this reason, very
mature revenue-cost programs, which are not yet possible to assess,
may have a smaller impact on cost than mature ones, which can be
evaluated at this time.
143. See Sloan, supra note 117.
144. See Coelen & Sullivan, An Analysis of the Effects of ProspectiveReimbursement
Programson Hospital Expenditures, 2 HALTH CARE FINANCING Rzv. 1 (Winter 1981).
145.

For further discussion, see F. SLOAN & B. STziNWALD, supra note 115, at 134-35.
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D. Regulatory Programs in Policy Perspective
While empirical evidence from statistical studies provides an
extremely important basis for evaluating regulatory programs, a
comprehensive analysis of regulatory policy should also include
consideration of normative, procedural, structural, and institutional factors. Examination of these factors is useful when empirical evidence is lacking and helps to interpret otherwise sterile
statistical findings. Thus, despite the absence of conclusive statistical findings on outcomes of competitive approaches, these approaches are gaining support as alternatives to regulation, primarily on normative and institutional grounds.
1.

Technical Limitations

Both facilities-services and utilization-quality regulation require that decisions be made with reference to a well-defined standard of patient and/or community need. Facilities-services health
planners assign numerical benchmarks as part of their regulation
writing. Unfortunately, no single number adequately serves as an
indicator of need. The adopted ratio of four beds per thousand
population has little or no empirical basis.14 6 Even if it did, it is
unclear how levels of care and cost are affected by ratios of 3.8 or
4.2.17 Although a continuum is more appealing conceptually than
a point estimate, health planners are ill-equipped to identify what
tradeoffs must be made at any single point, whether it be a fixed
criterion or a point within a range of acceptability. When, in addition, one considers matters such as travel time, population health
146.

For policy studies that assume an important relationship between bed capacity

and utilization of hospital services, see

INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
(1976); W. MCCLURE, REDUCING EX-

SCIENCES, CONTROLLING THE SUPPLY OF HOSPITAL BEDS

CESS HosPITAL CAPACITY (1976).

147. For early studies that associate increased bed supply with increased hospital use,
see Shain & Roemer, Hospital Costs Relate to the Supply of Beds, 92 MOD. HosPITAL, Apr.
1959, at 71; Wennberg & Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations in Health Care Delivery, 182
SCIENCE 1102 (1973). These studies show two-way relationships between beds and use.
Methodologically, such studies tend to be inferior to multivariate studies that take into account, in addition to beds, a number of possible determinants of utilization. For full scale
(multivariate) studies of the beds-hospital utilization relationships, see G. ROSENTHAL, THE
DEMAND FOR GENERAL HOSPITAL FAcuIIrIES

(1964); Feldstein, Hospital Cost Inflation: A

Study of Nonprofit Price Dynamics, 61 AM. ECON. REv. 853, 870 (1971); May, Utilization of
Health Services and the Availability of Resources, in EQUITY IN HEAILTH SanvicEs: EmpnuCAL ANALYSIS IN SOCIAL POLICY

131 (R. Anderson, J. Kravits & 0. Anderson eds. 1975). Pro-

fessor Rosenthal's research suggests that the supply of hospital beds has virtually no effect
on hospital utilization. Professor Feldstein reports beds-admissions and beds-length of stay
elasticities in the 0.25 to 0.4 range. Professor May's estimated elasticities were 0.2 and lower.
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status, variations in patients' taste for health in comparison to
other aspects of quality of life, and ability-to-pay, numerically
specified regulatory norms assume an unreal aura of definitiveness.
Numbers can easily be specified but are inherently arbitrary; consensus is, for good reasons, difficult to achieve.
2.

Program Composition

An important justification for UR is the alleged ability of physicians to generate demand for their services. Presumably, review
of utilization levels provides a mechanism for curbing services of
greater benefit to the physician's pocketbooks than to the patient's
health. One questions whether the structure of a UR program such
this goal in a world of substantial physicianas PSRO facilitates
148
created demand.
By statute, PSROs are operated by local practicing physicians. 149 Suppose that a PSRO is placed in a town with a surfeit of
doctors. To earn a "decent living" each doctor must boost utilization over what it would otherwise be. The PSRO provides an excellent vehicle for increasing aggregate levels of utilization since it, in
effect, determines the controlling standard of medical practice in
its region. The PSRO-established standard will govern federal reimbursement decisions even if the local standard reflects suppliercreated demand. 50 Moreover, since compliance with PSRO-established norms results in malpractice liability immunity for providers,' 5 ' doctors who do not adhere to PSRO norms are encouraged
to shift their level of practice up to PSRO levels. Otherwise, a noncomplying physician risks malpractice exposure, and counsel for
plaintiffs will point to PSRO-established norms as the appropriate
standard of practice in the community. Although national oversight of local PSRO norms is possible, federal administrators apparently renounced the exercise of that authority in order to win
physicians' support for the PSRO program. 52
In sum, then, rather than police supplier-created demand,
148. See Sloan & Feldman, Competition Among Physicians, in

COMPETITION IN THE

HEALTH CARE SECTOR, supra note 20, at 81-85.

149. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-l(b)(1)(A) (1976 & Supp. I 1977).
150. See Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 10, at 47-51.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-16(c) (1976). See Note, Federally Imposed Self-Regulation of
Medical Practice:A Critique of the ProfessionalStandards Review Organization,42 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 822, 838-42 (1974); Comment, PSRO: Malpractice Liability and the Impact
of the Civil Immunity Clause, 62 GEO. L.J. 1499 (1974).
152. See Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 10, at 47-51.
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PSROs may legitimize community practice. Even worse, PSROs
may serve as a convenient forum, probably immune from antitrust
liability, in which physicians acting collectively may increase
rather than reduce levels of utilization. 153 All the while, the PSRO
can camouflage this type of economic collusion under the guise of
quality assurance. It is no wonder that the PSRO program is seriously being considered for elimination.""
3.

Lack of Proper Institutional Incentives

Three types of limitations are common to existing federal regulatory programs-geographical orientation, limited regulatory jurisdiction, and lack of a predetermined budget.
(a)

GeographicalOrientation

Although the geographical approach to jurisdiction of regulatory agencies serves valid policy objectives, it also has serious
drawbacks. A regional regulatory body, such as a PSRO or an
HSA, has no institutional reason to act in a tight-fisted manner.
Since third parties pay for nearly all hospital expenses and since
most of those payments come from the federal treasury, a regional
regulatory body will aggressively pursue cost containment only out
of an abstract commitment to the goal. It is all too easy to rationalize permissive regulatory policies as promoting improved quality
of or access to care. The agency will be particularly reluctant to
take a tight-fisted approach when its own constituents bear the adverse effect of an aggressive cost-containment strategy and the
benefits of reducing costs are spread widely, among all federal taxpayers in the case of Medicare.
In order for the system to function properly, therefore, regional agencies must rely on an implicit reciprocity of regulatory
philosophy among regulatory bodies across regions and states.
Even assuming agreement on philosophy, however, the absence of
an enforcement mechanism and the varying political viewpoints in
different parts of the nation make it difficult to enforce any understandings. Thus, when a tight-fisted local PSRO causes the community to lose federal health dollars, neither the PSRO itself, the
deprived patient, nor the individual provider receives any apparent
reward.1 55 IVideed, the physician members of the PSRO may face
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 53-54, 66-67.
See [1981] 4 MEDIcARE & MEDICAID GumE (CCH), Report Letter #318, at 1.
See Blumstfin, supra note 48, at 283-85. See also note 46 supra and accompany-
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the wrath of colleagues angry with negative PSRO decisions since
the benefit looms as abstract, hypothetical, and widely dispersed
and the real harm is localized, identifiable, and concentrated. 156 Inevitably, the PSRO will back away from a serious effort against
escalating costs. Absent institutionalized incentives for minimizing
costs, such nonfeasance is all too easily rationalized as a means for
improving quality and access.
(b) Limited Jurisdiction
Health planning and CON agencies, rate review bodies, and
PSROs exercise very circumscribed substantive jurisdiction. Planning and CON agencies have no authority over utilization. PSROs
do not influence capital expenditures or other such cost-generating
elements. Neither PSROs nor CON agencies control utilization or
capital expenditures in noninstitutional settings; they also exercise
no authority over individual or institutional pricing decisions, or
federal or private third-party reimbursement schedules. Rate review commissions affect prices or revenues, but they exercise only
indirect jurisdiction over utilization and virtually none over capital
expenditures. The limited substantive jurisdiction of these regulatory agencies also leads to regulatory fragmentation and problems
in interagency cooperation, and the differences in agency composition exacerbate these potential bureaucratic conflicts.
No single agency can predict how its regulatees will respond to
regulatory decisions. Because of the lack of consensus on a model
of hospital behavior, one cannot accurately predict side effects of
specific regulatory decisions.157 For example, if a capital project is
disallowed, will the hospital compensate by hiring additional
nurses?1" If an external authority constrains prices, will the hospital seek to lengthen stays or reduce its teaching and community
outreach efforts? What side effects actually occur in response to
particular regulatory activities must be determined by statistical
analysis. The state of the theory, however, prevents ruling out undesirable side effects in advance.
ing text.
156. See Blumstein, supra note 48.
157. For a review of alternative theories of hospital behavior, see P.

FELDSTmN,

supra

supra note 20, at 69; Sloan, The Internal Organization of
Hospitals: A Descriptive Study, 15 HEAITH SERvICES RESEARCH 203 (1980).
note 39, at 186; J.

NEWHOUSE,

158. CON appears to increase hospital demand for labor inputs, including RNs, as a
compensatory response to capital regulation. F. SLOAN & B. STmINwALD, supra note 115, at
168-70.
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The problem of unintended side effects largely reflects the fact
that hospital outputs defy measurement in standard units. Although numbers of inpatient days, outpatient visits, and X-rays
can be counted, tremendous room exists for variation in the nature
of the product in terms of accessibility and convenience, as well as
effectiveness. Recent experience with prospective payment on a per
case basis demonstrates hospitals' ingenuity in classifying patients
59
1
to increase allowable reimbursements.
The responses of regulatees to regulatory behavior may well

fall outside the purview of the agency in question. Thus, a regulatee might play off one agency against another. Moreover, because
the regulatory bodies have different compositions, they will not all
have uniform or even similar value preferences in terms of overall
regulatory objectives. 160 Overall costs of regulation should include
the private sector resources allocated to "beating the system" and
the program distortions that arise from a form of regulatory
whipsawing.
(c)

Lack of PredeterminedBudget

Because of the absence of any ceiling on caRital expenditures
for an area, a capital-facilities regulator faces asymmetric gains
and losses. Approval of a project at Hospital A does not affect
funds available for a project at Hospital B. Moreover, the agency is
not explicitly rewarded for policing a "wasteful" outlay of public
funds at Hospital A."e ' The agency does, however, face potential
political pressure from A, which is difficult to resist in view of the
amorphous concept of need on which the adverse decision was
probably based and the speculative nature of the local benefits
that accrue from a tough-minded, cost-conscious decision. A similar phenomenon occurs for PSROs that establish norms of care
and apply those norms without any predetermined budget. As a
consequence, the PSRO need not directly confront quality/cost
tradeoffs. With open-ended funding, a PSRO can approve medical
services without perceiving a direct, negative consequence to any
other potential beneficiary within its jurisdiction.
159. For a discussion of recent experience in New Jersey with Diagnosis Related
Groups (DRGs) and per case payment, see Larson, Hospital Program to Charge by the
Ailment Raises Questions of Health Care Quality, Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1980, at 23, col. 3.
160. See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 22, at 15-16.
161. In response to this problem, the Carter Administration proposed hospital capital
expenditure limits. See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 22; Dunn & Lefkowitz, supra note
71.
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The lack of a predetermined budget suggests that neither
CON agencies nor PSROs will perceive allocation decisions in either/or terms. Rather, they will typically view them in yes/no
terms, because it is easier to say "yes" when to say "no" results in
no visible or discernible benefit to anyone in the agency's
jurisdiction.
The cost effectiveness of health maintenance organizations
(HMOs), which live within predetermined budgets, is the conceptual paradigm for PR regulatory programs.6 2 The goal of the
HMO is to place providers "at risk," so that they will have an incentive to count costs while presumably delivering care to a covered population that is in its collective best interest. The objective
is to have a provider institution look at quality in macro terms for
an entire group, not to focus exclusively on micro quality-that is,
the individual physician-patient encounter.
PR agencies administering "mature" programs have had some
success in restraining cost escalation by negotiating a predetermined level of prices or, as in two states, revenues.163 The principle
of holding provider institutions at risk seems successful when
transferred from the HMO to the regulatory arena. Most state PR
agencies, however, cannot control total levels of utilization, and in
a political climate the negotiated levels of prospective budgets may
be subject to manipulation absent market-generated pressures for
keeping prices and costs under control.
4. Equity
Several considerations relating to equity in the health care
system must be kept in mind when reviewing the regulatory efforts. First, because facilities-services regulators lack decertification powers, the burden of adjusting to the need standard falls on
prospective entrants. To the extent that the new entrant would
provide more efficient and effective services, this type of regulation
has efficiency as well as equity implications. The 1979 amendments
162. HMOs are a form of prepaid group practice. Consumers pay a specified fee negotiated in advance, and providers are obligated to provide an agreed upon range of services
for that fee. Providers, thus, must live within a fixed budget in delivering care to a defined
population. Since they are responsible for cost overruns, the providers are "at risk"
financially. See generally Luft, Assessing the Evidence in HMO Performance, 58 MILNKi
MEMORIAL FuND Q.: HEALTH & Soc'Y 501 (1980); Wolinsky, The Performance of Health
Maintenance Organizations:An Analytic Review, 58 MILBANK MEmoRuL FUND Q.: HEALTH
& Soc'y 537 (1980).
163. See Sloan, supra note 117.
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to the federal health planning act, which largely exempt HMOs
from coverage under CON,1 ' ameliorated some of the most pernicious consequences of this phenomenon. Second, as a practical
matter, prospective rates or budgets are typically set with reference to levels of cost in a base period. This rewards the profligate
hospital for its waste and at the same time penalizes the efficient
hospital for its efficiency. Any other reference standard for raterevenue setting, however, would probably be seen as potentially
too disruptive. Third, price regulation "with teeth" contains cost
by creating a contrived scarcity of supply and thus an excess in
demand. In contrast, various nonprice mechanisms-for example,
lengthening queues and deterioration in quality and amenities-are used to balance supply and demand. Nonprice rationing
imposes high costs on consumers that do not appear in public
budgets, but are very real and not necessarily fairly or efficiently
distributed.
5.

Other Practical and Political Considerations

A real question exists whether citizen participation can be of
value in providing a balanced perspective in regulatory bodies.""
PSROs have only physician membership, but HSAs must be composed of a majority of nonproviders.1 6 Providers and consumers as
a group are likely to have similar views on the overriding issues of
cost containment and balancing the goals of quality, cost, and access. Given the structure and institutional incentives, all participants have a stake in more and better services.
Disputes may arise, however, between different groups of consumers. A typical debate concerns the relative importance to be
attached to the needs of underserved populations as weighed
against the desires of other groups for even higher quality services.1 67 Recent federal CON regulations, by establishing result-oriented provisions about adverse effects on underserved populations,' 8 appear to recognize that consumer representation alone
164.

42 U.S.C. § 300m-6(b) (Supp. 11 1979); see 45 Fed. Reg. 69,740, 69,748 (1980) (to

be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 123.405); Havighurst, Prospects for Competition under Health
Planning-cum-Regulation,in NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: WHAT Now, supra note 53, at
329.
165. See Marmor & Morone, Representing Consumer Interests:Imbalanced Markets,
Health Planning, and the HSAs, 58 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q.: HEALTH & Soc'Y 125
(1980).
166. Id. at 131.
167. See generally Marmor & Morone, supra note 165.
168. 45 Fed. Reg. 69,740, 69,741, 69,752-54 (1980) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§
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will not assure a legitimate airing of these distributive issues or

ensure an outcome favorable to underserved groups. Moreover, because of the highly technical nature of many regulatory decisions,
providers strongly influence agencies even when consumers are
present. Overall, consumer representation in the regulatory process
is unlikely to constrain the allocative process, though it may affect
the distribution of health care resources.
Additionally, some question exists whether a form of regulation that is truly successful in containing costs will be allowed to
function without externally imposed constraints. For example,
New York's rate regulation program, which may have reduced hospital costs below what they otherwise might have been, apparently
adversely affected some hospitals servicing low-income populations. 169 A major political flap ensued, and the prospective closing
of at least one hospital was challenged in federal court 117 on the
ground that any such action having a disproportionate impact on a
minority group was illegal under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. 71 Although that particular lawsuit was unsuccessful, the federal Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) supported
plaintiffs' legal position. 172
Adoption of a disproportionate impact theory could have farreaching consequences for programs designed to contain costs.
While the Second Circuit declined to adopt the effects test of dis123.412(a)(5)-(6), .413).
The former administrator of the Health Resources Administration of the Department of

Health and Human Services, Henry A. Foley, acknowledges that consumers in the planning
process are typically most interested in access issues and that providers are most concerned
with questions of quality. He views health planning as a "mechanism for promoting pragmatic bargaining about the development of community resources to meet problems of access
...
." Foley, Health Planning-Demise or Reformation, 304 NPw ENG. J. MED. 969, 970
(1981). Foley does not see health planning as a strong tool for cost containment ("the government oversold the cost-containment aspects of health planning," id. at 972.); he advocates recognition that the planning process provides "a forum for negotiation about the allocation of resources at the local level, and a mechanism for educating the public about the
health-care system." Id. at 972. Foley assumes, apparently, that the overall level of resources will be set by some other device, but he does not specify what method is to be used.
169. For a general discussion of hospital closures in New York City, see UNITED HospiTAL FUND, 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEALTH POLICY FORUM ON HosprrAL CLOSURES IN NEW
YORK Crry, OCTOBER 26-27, 1978 (1980).
170. See Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.

1980).
171. Section 601 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides as follows: "No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
172. 627 F.2d at 615 n.1.
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crimination under Title VI in the Sydenham Hospital litigation,17 3
HHS seems to have imposed that standard in its most recent CON
regulations. 7 4 Thus, when a health care facility seeks to reduce or
eliminate a service, CON agency review is triggered.17 5 One of the
factors the reviewing agency must consider is the effect of the reduction, elimination, or relocation of services on the ability of underserved groups to obtain health care.7 6 Of all the criteria specified in the regulations,'" only the effect that an agency
determination will have on access to care by underserved groups
8
must be the basis of a specific agency findingY
This access provision raises weighty political issues for any serious regulatory cost containment strategy. Given the requirement
for specific access findings, it is more difficult for a regulatory
agency to withstand the political pressure that surely will come
from the termination of a service or the closing or even bankruptcy
of a hospital as part of a policy of fiscal stringency. One of the
serious risks of a successful rate-revenue control program is that it
will result in hospital failure and that the failure rates will have a
disproportionate impact on underserved populations. If the affected groups are able to offset those consequences either in court
or in the political arena, the cost-reducing effects of the rate-revenue programs will be vitiated.
E. Planningfor Competition
Largely in response to the general political climate in the
United States favoring deregulation of certain key sectors, the paucity of demonstrated successes of health planning in particular,
and the overall institutional critique of existing health regulation
173. The court declined to rule on whether a finding of a Title VI violation requires a
showing of discriminatory intent or racially disproportionate impact. Id. at 615. At least one
panel of the Second Circuit, however, has concluded that discriminatory purpose is the
proper standard under Title VI. Lora v. Board of Educ., 623 F.2d 248, 250 (2d Cir. 1980);
accord, Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
174. See 45 Fed. Reg. 69,740, 69,752-53 (1980) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
123.412(5) (ii)). These regulations are consistent with the federal government's Title VI regulations. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1980). See generallyBryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 621-23
(2d Cir. 1980) (Kearse, J., dissenting).
175. 45 Fed. Reg. 69,740-41, 69,747, 69,752 (1980) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§
123.404(a)(i)(B), .412(a)(5)(ii)).
176. 45 Fed. Reg. 69,740, 69,752 (1980) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 123.412(a)(5)(ii)).
177. The CON regulations specify 21 criteria. 45 Fed. Reg. 69,740, 69,752-53 (1980) (to
be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 123.412).
178. 45 Fed. Reg. 69,740, 69,745, 69,753-54 (1980) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§
122.311, 123.413). See also 45 Fed. Reg. 69,772-73 (1980).
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programs, there has been a growing sentiment for using health
planning and regulation to promote competition. 17 9 Although this
may seem a contradiction in terms, proponents of this strategy
have offered specifics. For example, the National Chamber Foundation has suggested that planners might develop a climate that
fosters competition by doing some or all of the following: (1) developing constituencies for market-oriented approaches to health care
in the local business community, among consumers, labor, health
insurers, government, and other potentially interested parties; (2)
promoting the development of alternative delivery systems (ADS),
including prepaid group practices, independent practice associations (IPA), health care alliances, and HMOs; (3) assisting in
recruiting enrollees for alternatives to the fee-for-service system;
(4) easing regulatory restrictions that impede entry of ADS; (5) enforcing antitrust measures to eliminate anticompetitive collective
actions by providers; (6) encouraging businesses, unions, and insurers to offer multiple-choice benefit plans to employees and facilitating informed choices among the options by encouraging healtheducation campaigns, physician directories, and the like; (7) promoting enrollment of Medicare and Medicaid eligibles in efficient
delivery systems; and (8) serving as an independent source of information on the quality of care provided in the area. 80
Most of these activities represent a dramatic departure from
past and present planning-regulatory agency practices. The agenda
for planner-regulators proposed by the National Chamber Foundation raises a number of interesting questions. To date, the principal role of health planning has been to develop health plans for
geographic areas and evaluate the merits of specific proposals by
institutions that are contemplating specific investments and/or service changes.181 At the same time, planners have functioned under
rather severe budget limitations. Thus, it is questionable whether
planning agencies have the resources, the know-how, the inclination, or the incentives to accept these new responsibilities. Despite
the hopeful comments of some market proponents who wish to
179.

See Havighurst, supra note 164.

180. NATONAL CHAMR FOUNDATION, A

NATIONAL HEALTH CARE STRATEGY:
NESS CAN IMPROVE HEALTH AND REGULATION 17-18 (1978).

How Busi-

181. See Atkisson & Grimes, Health Planningin the United States: An Old Idea with
a New Significance, 1 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 295 (1976); Blumstein & Sloan, supra

note 22; Bovbjerg, supra note 32; O'Connor, Comprehensive Health Planning:Dreams and
Realities, 52 MILBANxK MEMoRIAL FUND Q.: HALTH & Soc'y 391 (1974); West & Stevens,
Comparative Analysis of Community Health Planning: Transition from CHPs to HSAs, 1
J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 173 (1976).
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take advantage of the enthusiasm of a closet Alfred Kahn here or
there on an HSA staff,'82 a very serious question exists about
whether HSAs or other health planning units have a comparative
advantage in or an adequate legal mandate for spearheading deregulation or promoting alternative delivery systems. More fundamentally, if the failure of market forces in health care is attributable to current methods of paying for health services, 183 it would

seem essential that a viable competitive alternative address this
basic source of the problem rather than become distracted with potentially time-consuming but eventually meaningless regulatory
tinkering. The issue, in sum, is whether proposals for a procompetitive planning-regulation strategy truly represent a constructive
alternative course of action or whether they are merely diversionary "makework" for an institutional apparatus whose time has
passed.
The federal Health Planning and Resources Development
Amendments of 19791" embody an important recent example of
the application of the procompetitive approach to planning and
regulation. Although the federal legislation is much more modest
than the changes suggested by the National Chamber Foundation,
it nevertheless represents a dramatic departure from past legislative attitudes toward planning-regulation. The 1979 health planning amendments explicitly recognize the promotion of competition as a desired goal of federal health policy. 185 This is quite a
change from the attitude evidenced in the legislative history of the
1974 health planning act when the Senate report stated, "[T]he
health services industry does not respond to classic market
forces."18' 6 The 1979 report observed that the industry "has not to
date responded" 187 to market forces but implicitly expressed the
hope that competition and the market could be put to productive
182. See Havighurst, supra note 164, at 351.
183. See H. FRECH & P. GINSBURG, supra note 50, at 21-22; J. KRIZAY & A. WILSON,
supra note 52, at 30-31.
184. Pub. L. No. 96-79, 93 Stat. 592 (1979). Utah's procompetitive CON legislation,
enacted in March 1979, is discussed below at note 213. See also Havighurst, supra note 164,
at 338-39.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 300k-2(a)(17),-(b)(3) (Supp. III 1979).
186. SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PuBLIc WELFARE, NATIONAL HEALTH PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT AND HEALTH FACILITIES ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1974, S. REP. No. 93-1285, 93d

Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (to accompany S. 2994), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7842.

187.

SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND

HUMAN

RESOURCES, HEALTH PLANNING AMENDMENTS

OF 1979, S. REP. No. 96-96, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1979) (to accompany S. 544).
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use in the health sector.188
The 1979 legislation appears to have adopted the view that
regulation is appropriate as an antidote for existing or inherent
market failure. Legislative findings noted that the effect of competition on the supply of health facilities and services is presently
diminished because of "prevailing methods of paying for health
services by public and private insurers, particularly for inpatient
health services and other institutional health services."' i8 When
competition "does not or will not appropriately allocate supply," 190
the amendments provide that planning agencies should "give priority.

. .

to actions which would strengthen the effect of competi-

tion on the supply of such services."' 9 '
These modest procompetition goals, while representing a considerable change of attitude from the 1974 health planning legislation, suffer from the same deficiencies as the other planning goals:
they are long on aspiration but short on implementation. 92 On the
other hand, the 1979 legislation does mandate the virtual exemption of HMOs from coverage under CON.'9 s Critics had argued
that given the fact that HMOs already face sufficient cost-containment incentives, they should not be required to undergo the CON
process. 9 4 If anything, CON, as applied to HMOs, could prevent
the entry of a major source of competition to traditional fee-forservice providers.'9 5 The mandatory HMO exemption from CON is
a legitimate step toward recognizing, in a substantive way, the desirability of allowing market forces to operate where they can.
Despite their hope that regulations implementing the amendments' procompetition sections would be developed imaginatively,' 98 Havighurst and Hackbarth, writing in May 1980, were realistically sober in recognizing that the HHS "record of hostility to
the market . . . cast[s] doubt on its willingness to take the new

mandate seriously."'9 " Unfortunately, the skepticism about HHS's
188. See Havighurst & Hackbarth, supra note 21.
189. 42 U.S.C. § 300k-2(b)(1) (Supp. I 1979).

190. 42 U.S.C. § 300k-2(b)(2) (Supp. H 1979).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 300k-2(b)(3) (Supp. III 1979).
192. See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 22, at 17-19.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 300m-6(b) (Supp. In 1979).
194. See Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and Health Planners, 1978
UTAH L. REv. 123, 140-54.
195. Id.
196. For example, the regulations might have required findings on the impact of proposals on competition.
197. Havighurst & Hackbarth, supra note 21, at 46.
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intentions was well founded. The regulations, published in October
1980, make only a token response to the statutory competitive initiative. Sections 123.412(a)(17) and (18),191 which establish the
competitive review criteria, border on unintelligibility, 1" and the
HHS explanation of its competition criteria is hardly more enlightening.200 The Department promised a monograph on how competition should be included in health plans, but it declined to permit
exemptions from CON review or to require "individual determinations [of competitive impact] as applications are being
reviewed.

'201

On the other hand, HHS felt perfectly at ease in imposing
even greater regulatory control on facilities and equipment decisions, expanding CON review to encompass termination as well as
expansion, and making its replacement decisions in the name of
access equity.20 2 Although the regulations require no findings on

competitive effect, they do mandate specific findings on access for
underserved populations.203 Apparently, the portion of the regula24
tions implementing the HMO exemption provisions was adopted '
only because the statute commanded an exemption.205
Thus, HHS hostility to the role of competition, as reflected in
its October 1980 CON regulations, has short-circuited the procompetitive initiative, except for the HMO exemption, at least for the
time being. Even if HHS suddenly has a change of heart under the
stewardship of Secretary Richard Schweiker,0 6 it is doubtful that
198. 45 Fed. Reg. 69,740, 69,753 (1980) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 123.412(a)(17) (18)).
199. For example, the regulations provide that state planning agencies conducting
CON reviews must consider "the factors which affect the effect of competition on the supply
of health services being reviewed." Id.
200. Id. at 69,771.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 69,740-41, 69,757-58, 69,768-70, 69,772-73.
203. Id. at 69,753-54 (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 123.413).
204. Id. at 69,748-49 (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 123.405).
205. In explaining its CON regulations on HMOs, HHS noted some dissatisfaction
with the exemption of HMOs from CON. HHS observed that the statute, not the "Department's interpretation" of the statute, "required" special consideration be given to HMOs.
"In general," noted HHS, it has "little latitude in setting forth the certificate of need requirements for HMOs .... ." Id. at 69,760.
206. Early indications have not been as promising as one might have hoped. For example, Secretary Schweiker at one point prohibited Food and Drug Administration approval of
generic prescription drugs unless the drugs undergo independent testing, which is costly and
time consuming. The extra testing, which would slow competition with brand drugs whose
patents expire, would have been required even though the generic drugs duplicate drugs
sold under patent for seventeen years. See Mecham, Reagan, Big Drug Firms Said Linked,
Nashville Tennessean, March 11, 1981, at 2, col. 6.
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the change per se could have a dramatic impact on health care
markets.
First, changes in health care financing are beyond the scope of
health planning legislation, and, as Congress acknowledged in the
1979 amendments, health care market failure is largely attributable to current payment practices. °7 Second, while as Congress has
recognized, °8 insurance is the dominant source of payment for inpatient care, a sizeable portion of the health system is not dominated by insurance. The Congress, however, has not granted planning agencies jurisdiction over parts of the health system in which
insurance is less dominant, such as offices of physicians and dentists. Thus, even if HHS aggressively committed itself to competi20
tion, it is not clear that it could implement subsection 1502(b)(3) 9
in a meaningful or effective manner. Third, the 1979 amendments
do not change important features of state CON laws that have contributed to past regulatory failures. Importantly, planner-regulators are not explicitly rewarded for fostering efficiency. Even if the
planners had jurisdiction over noninstitutional providers, they
have no incentive to undertake actions that, while procompetitive,
may be strenuously opposed by existing providers.2 10
In sum, the 1979 health planning amendments may have reopened the debate about the possible role of competition in health
care. HHS's implementing regulations, however, do not pick up on
this opportunity to promote competition by planning and regulation. Some question exists whether even a willing HHS could make
much of an impact, although the HMO exemption probably is an
experiment worth monitoring. Since the present planning-for-competition approach is so narrowly focused-without jurisdiction, for
example, over reimbursement, revenues, or levels of utilization-it
falls far short of the reformist agenda necessary for a fair market
test of competition in the health sector. It is too soon to tell
After considerable political pressure from Representative Albert Gore, Jr., among
others, Secretary Schweiker apparently reversed his initial decision. See Wall St. J., April
17, 1981, at 1, col. 3. For a fuller story, see Reversing Policy, U.S. Eases Path to Generic
Drugs, Nashville Tennessean, April 17, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
207. 42 U.S.C. § 300k-2(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
208. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 300k-2(b)(2) (Supp. HI 1979).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 300k-3(b)(3) (Supp. UI 1979). See text accompanying note 191 supra.
210. A recent proposal by Walter McClure for a local incentive health care surtax,
which explicitly rewards cost saving actions undertaken at the local level by area HSAs and
other parties, may be a step toward correcting this problem. See McClure, An Incentive Tax
in Medicare, Medicaid, and National Health Insurance, 5 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 10

(1980).
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whether the amendments are worthwhile as a tactical move in the
right direction, a bellwether. 11
IV. EMERGENT DIRECTIONS IN HEALTH POLICY
Whereas procompetitive regulation engrafts concepts of competition onto a framework of controls over health care suppliers,
market-perfecting or incentive approaches to reform start from the
opposite direction. The regulatory strategy focuses on the need to
limit hospital prices, utilization, revenues and capital expenditures,
and physicians' fees; the market-perfecting approaches seek to
achieve cost containment by enabling consumers to make choices
in the health care marketplace and by providing them with appropriate incentives. While a role for some regulation is acknowledged,
incentives approaches emphasize rules that are designed principally to improve consumer decisionmaking or otherwise nurture
the institutional structure of the competitive marketplace.2 2
Advocates of market-oriented approaches fall into two camps.
The first emphasizes consumer cost-consciousness by advocating
the introduction of deductibles and coinsurance, perhaps with a
211. In 1979 Utah enacted a CON law which recognizes in its statement of purpose
that "the degree to which competition and consumer choice can constructively serve the
public purposes of quality assurance, cost containment and responsiveness to consumers'
preferences varies from service to service and place to place." UTAH CoDE ANN. § 26-34-2(2)
(Supp. 1979). The Act requires that the state planning apparatus consider as part of the
CON review of a specific project:
The relationship of the project proposed to be provided to the existing health care
system of the area in which such project is proposed to be provided, including the
effect of the proposed facility or service on the maintenance of competitive conditions
in the local market; in assessing the relationship of proposed services to the existing
health care system, any consideration given to the ability of an existing provider to
continue to offer service of this or a similar type shall be contained in the findings
required ....

Id. at § 26-34-11(f).
The Utah CON law recognizes, as do the 1979 Amendments enacted at the federal level,
the potential benefits which derive from competition in the health care market. The law,
however, applies only to health care facilities, a term that encompasses hospitals, nursing
homes, ambulatory surgical units, HMOs (specificially excluded by the federal 1979 Amendments), and home health agencies, excluding physicians' offices. Under the Utah law, planners still react to proposed projects rather than initiating them. Thus, the planner has no
incentives to promote competition. Furthermore, planners may interpret the Utah CON
law's statement of purpose as a license to protect the "ins" against potential efficient
competitors.
The Utah law is still new, and it is too early to assess this marriage of the planningregulation and market-oriented approaches. Utah's recognition that competition provides an
alternative worth trying is commendable. Yet, it would appear, especially when one considers previous evidence with CON, that circumstances warrant a more radical solution.
212. See, e.g., Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra note 22, at 382-87.
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ceiling on patient out-of-pocket payments that may vary directly
with household income. This strategy preserves the fee-for-service
payment system. Underlying this approach is the notion that consumers will learn to choose among alternatives since they are likely
to pay out of their own pockets for a proportion of any extra expenses. Furthermore, this approach assumes cost-conscious consumers or their information intermediaries will
encourage provid213
ers to conserve scarce health care resources.
The second strategy emphasizes the role of competition between various types of ADSs and the fee-for-service system. 14 Proponents of this strategy contend that, if presented with alternative
sets of "prepackaged" services, consumers can make informed decisions about quantity, quality, and price embodied in the alternative packages. When they are well, consumers are in a position to
seek out information and to make a sensible selection. When patients are confronted with illness and a potentially major expense,
rational consumer choice may be more difficult.
Although they agree that the most desirable road to cost containment is through strengthening the hand of the consumer, advocates of each approach find deficiencies in the other. Proponents of
the copayment strategy are skeptical about ADSs for three reasons.
First, although some types of ADSs have been devised rather recently, the concept underlying the major ADS, prepaid group practice, has been around for years. Proponents of copayment wonder
why, if this concept is so attractive to consumers and providers,
the growth of prepaid groups has been so slow.2 5 They contend
that it is imprudent to design health policy strategy around systems that currently account for an insignificant share of the total
health care sector.2'1 6 Second, they wonder to what extent the cost
savings attributable to ADSs are real. A substantial proportion of
the savings may be due to preferred case selection 217 and out-of213. See Seidman, supra note 53.
214. See, e.g., A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 34; McClure, On Broadening the Definition of
and Removing Regulatory Barriers to a Competitive Health Care System, 3 J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L. 303 (1978).

215. See generally McNeil & Schlenker, HMOs, Competition, and Government, 53
Q.: HEALTH & Soc'y 195 (1975).
216. Eli Ginzberg and others have made this point in discussions of competitive alternatives to health care delivery. See Ginzberg, supra note 73, at 1112-13.
217. Empirical analysis of patient choices between HMO and traditional fee-for-service plans reveals no differences in health status between persons who select HMOs and
those who select fee-for-service plans. See Berki & Ashcraft, HMO Enrollment: Who Joins
and Why: A Review of the Literature, 58 MILBANK MEMORIAL FuND Q.: HEALTH & Soc'Y
588, 626 (1980). Past studies have focused on employed persons' choices of plans. Evidence
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND
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plan use may not be recorded as an ADS expense.21 If ADSs' market share were expanded from less than ten percent to, say, fifty
percent or more of the market, would the reported cost savings
persist? Payments to providers-for example, compensation for
loss of professional independence-might have to rise to recruit
providers not otherwise inclined to join ADS plans. These latterday recruits may not be as cost-conscious as their colleagues who,
perhaps out of a sense of predisposition or commitment, joined
ADS plans initially.2 19 Last, an ADS is fine so long as the patient is
healthy. One wonders, 'however, whether, when serious illness
strikes, the patient will be satisfied with ADS providers' choices of
doctors and modes of treatment. For this reason alone, patients
with relatively high probabilities of serious illness may eschew
ADSs.
Similarly, proponents of the ADS-oriented approach find various deficiencies in the cost-sharing strategy. First, they reason that
physicians have the capacity to control demand for their services.
Under fee-for-service systems, each extra service generated is a
source of extra revenue for the provider. The copayment approach
may reduce supplier-induced demand, but not by much because
political considerations narrow the range of acceptable coinsurance
rates. With ADS sytems, however, extra service means a lower
profit. Thus, even if the provider had demand-generating power,
he would not exercise it if part of an ADS. 20 Second, copayment is
unrealistic for inpatient services, which are the source of much of
the cost problem.2 21 After all, the patient's expense is likely to exon choices by the aged and unemployed is needed.
218. According to Professor Luft, supra note 162, at 511, 519, outside use of prepaid
group practice plans accounts for 7% to 14% of all services that members receive. Therefore, out-of-plan use does not offset the estimated cost saving of 10% to 40% attributed to
prepaid group practice over conventional fee-for-service.
219. The body of empirical research on physician satisfaction with prepaid group practice, the only ADS with a long history, is still rather meager. See, e.g., R. HrHERINGTON, C.
HOPKINS & M. ROEMER, HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE (1975); D.
MECHANIC, THE GROWTH OF BUREAUCRATIC MEDICINE (1975); Freidson, Prepaid Group Practice and the New "DemandingPatient," 51 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q.: HEALTH & SOC'Y

473 (1973); Mechanic, The Organization of Medical Practice and Practice Orientation
Among Physicians in Prepaidand Nonprepaid Primary Care Settings, 13 MED. CARE 189
(1975).
220. Economists have debated the issue of physician-induced demand at length. See,
e.g., Reinhardt, Comment, in COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR, supra note 20, at
121; Sloan & Feldman, Competition Among Physicians, in COMPETITION

supra note 20, at 45.
221. See Newhouse, Commentary, in NATIONAL

IN THE

HEALTH

CARE SECTOR,

note 53, at 371.
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ceed any politically palatable deductible on the first inpatient day.
If the plan's out-of-pocket ceiling is set at a level consistent with
moderate risk protection, the expense will soon reach the region of
full insurance coverage, at which point neither the patient nor his
physician-agent has any incentive to conserve hospital resources.
On the other hand, if the ceiling is raised for efficiency reasons, the
patient assumes a high degree of risk. Third, with an ADS, consumers make decisions about care before they are confronted with
an illness. The copayment strategy, however, if it is to succeed, requires patients to make tough choices among providers at a time
when they are ill-equipped to do so.
Fortunately, the incentive approach does not require that society act collectively to choose between the two strategies. Rather,
once a set of incentives has been established, market forces can
decide.
The questions raised by the two camps, however, do suggest a
need for considerably more thought as well as further empirical
research on both of these competitive strategies. Further research
is especially important because the normative and prudential attractiveness of competitive alternatives, in combination with the
empirical and structural critiques of the regulatory approach, have
222
led to active examination of market-perfecting strategies.
222. During the 96th Congress, a number of bills incorporating the incentive approach
were introduced by Senators Durenberger (S. 1968, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)), and
Schweiker (S. 1590, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)), and Representatives Jones (H.R. 7528,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980)), Martin (H.R. 6405, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980)), Gephardt and
Stockman (H.R. 7527, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980)), and Ullman (H.R. 5740, 96th Cong., 1st
Seas. (1979)). Although each differs in details, the essence of each bill is to eschew the regulatory approach in favor of (1) limits on the tax-free premium an employer may contribute
to a health plan; (2) requirements that employers offer employees choices among health
plans; and (3) incentives for consumer cost consciousness-for example, employees who select a lower cost health plan would be allowed to retain the savings in premiums or, if a
more costly alternative is selected, to pay out of pocket the excess premium over the fixed
employer health plan contribution. Even though the plans taken as a group are more in
accord with the market-oriented strategy that relies on provider cost consciousness, they do
not eliminate fee-for-service.
The design of market-oriented health legislation is by no means straightforward. These
are some of the thorny issues that should be considered. Their complexity, and the controversy among market-oriented proponents about provider versus consumer-based approaches, explain in part why the 96th Congress enacted none of the above bills into law.
First, although the fee-for-service system has often been defended on the ground that it
provides "freedom of choice," there is a valid question whether this is in fact so, since employers seldom offer employees a range of options from which to choose. And, if given a
choice, the employee rarely reaps all or even part of the savings from selecting an option
with a lower premium. See A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 34, at 72. For competition to work,
employees must have both choices and explicit incentives. But employers and/or labor un-
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The developments to be considered next in this section either
are aimed at or may have the effect of restoring a system of decentralized decisionmaking by overcoming market imperfections or
otherwise reestablishing incentives for private choice. In short,
when there are deviations from ideal market conditions, these approaches seek to alleviate the problem rather than substitute a regulatory for a competitive system.
A.

The Commercial Speech Doctrine

In 1976 the Supreme Court gave impetus to the competitive
alternative, albeit in a perhaps unintended manner. Prior to the
decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
ions can claim that offering options is costly. The extent to which mandatory choice will
raise administrative costs to employers is unknown; but the fact that few employers have
offered it historically at least suggests that the cost may not be negligible.
Second, if a tax credit is to be granted for the purchase of insurance, which plans are to
qualify for the credit? Presumably, Congress could decide to eliminate all current preferential treatment of health insurance purchases under the current U.S. tax code and return the
extra tax revenue gained thereby in the form of tax credits, lower marginal rates on personal
and/or corporate incom6 taxes, public expenditures on other programs or combinations
thereof. Society, however, appears to have a special concern for health care, and this option
has not yet been politically viable. Therefore, a qualified plan must be defined by statute
and/or regulation. If the standard is set too low, a potential adverse selection problem may
arise. A healthy person might select a low option plan, at least while healthy. When illness
strikes, he may decide to join his sicker compatriots in the high option plan. But if the high
option plan contains a disproportionate number of sick persons, however, its premium will
be unduly high. See Enthoven, Supply Side Economics of Health Care and Consumer
Choice Health Plan, in HEALTH CARS, supra note 121. Some experts, such as Jack Meyer,
have argued that this is not a serious problem since most insurance under these proposals
would remain employer-based and experience-rating would be by firm or plant rather than
by individual. See Meyer, Health Care Competition: Are Tax Incentives Enough?, in
HEALTH CARE, supra note 121. Meyer's comment implicitly assumes that employee health
status within a group is reasonably homogenous. In any event, this problem does not exist if
high minimum standards are set in order for the plan to qualify for tax credits. High standards may, however, (1) force some persons to purchase much more insurance than their
tastes and financial resources dictate, (2) encourage some employers to drop health insurance altogether, a response to the 1974 federal pension reform, (3) cause endless haggling on
the part of certain professional groups not currently covered by insurance to be included
under the umbrella of high minimum standards, and (4) in the final analysis, could possibly
raise rather than lower the proportion of gross national product devoted to health care.
Last, proponents of regulation are very concerned about asymmetric information between providers and consumers. If providers currently use their dominant positions in the
health care market to generate unnecessary utilization, will they not underproduce when
their incentives are reversed? Although economists have shown the welfare loss associated
with overuse, see Feldstein, The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J. PoLMCAL
EcoN. 251 (1973), a welfare loss may also be associated with underuse. To guard against
such abuses, will regulation against false advertising suffice? Or are more extensive controls
on quality needed?
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Consumer Council, Inc.,23 commercial speech by professionals-for example, advertising-was widely prohibited, 2 4 usually on
grounds of professionalism. Although the first amendment bars
government from suppressing expression, 2 5 the generally accepted
view, based on Supreme Court decisions, was that commercial
speech, which "did no more than propose a commercial transaction, 1 22 was so far removed from any "exposition of ideas '2 7 that
it was not covered by the first amendment at all. 8
In the Virginia Board of Pharmacy decision, the Supreme
Court reviewed a Virginia law that prohibited a licensed pharmacist from advertising prices for prescription drugs. The evidence
showed that prices of both prescription and nonprescription drugs
varied considerably from store to store, even within the same locality." 9 Thus, for example, in Richmond the price of forty Achromycin tablets ranged from $2.59 to $6.00, while elsewhere in the
state the price of a given amount of tetracycline ranged from $1.20
to $9.00.230 The ban on advertising meant that consumers had

great difficulty in comparison shopping. As a result, pharmacies
that charged high prices were not subject to the constraints of the
market because price information was either unobtainable or obtainable only at very high transactions costs.
In rejecting the claim that commercial speech is beyond the
purview of the first amendment, the Court noted the importance of
"the free flow of commercial information"23
' 1 in the economic marketplace, especially for "the poor, the sick, and . . . the aged"
whom the "suppression of . . . drug price information hits the
hardest."2 32 Indeed, a consumer's interest in commercial messages

may well be keener than his interest in the political discourse usually accorded the highest degree of first amendment protection. 3
The Court's rationale in holding that commercial speech is a
form of expression protected under the first amendment rested
223. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
224. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
225. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
226. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
385 (1973).
227. Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
228. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
229. 425 U.S. at 754.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 763.
232. Id.

233. See generally Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530
(1980).
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squarely on the vital role that consumer information plays in the
economic marketplace. No matter how "tasteless or excessive, 2 34
advertising does "disseminat[e] . . . information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what
price." 235 In a "free enterprise economy" resources are allocated by
"numerous private economic decisions" that should be based on
ample information. By facilitating informed decisionmaking, the
communication of commercial information serves a societal interest. It improves the functioning of the free market system and
thereby increases the likelihood that economic resources will be allocated intelligently. "To this end, the free flow of commercial in'23 6
formation is indispensable.
The Court did not accept the state's essentially paternalistic
justifications for limiting advertising. The Court observed that
"the State's protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on
the advantages of their being kept in ignorance. 2 3 7 The state was
concerned that price competition would lower the quality of service and undermine the professional relationship between pharmacist and patient. The Court responded that the first amendment
commanded "an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach."2 3 8 Government must assume that information "is not itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interest if
only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to
that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to
close them."2 3 9 In sum, a state may not protect consumers from
themselves by keeping them in ignorance of competitive opportunities in the marketplace, even if those consumers eventually
choose to prefer lower quality goods or services at lower prices in
preference to goods or services delivered according to professionally determined standards of quality. Provided the choices advertised are legal2 40 and the terms of the advertising accurate (i.e., not
false, deceptive, or misleading),24 1 commercial messages are protected forms of expression under the first amendment.
After the Virginia Board of Pharmacy decision, the Court in
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

425 U.S. at 765.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 769.
Id. at 770.

239.

Id.

240. Id. at 772.
241.

Id. at 771 & n.24.
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Bates v. State Bar faced the question whether states could prohibit lawyers from advertising the prices at which they perform
specified routine services.242 The Court in Bates upheld the first
amendment right of lawyers to advertise, rejecting many of the
same paternalistic arguments advanced in the pharmacists' case.
Thus, the Court was unpersuaded by defendants' argument that
advertising, because it is a candid acknowledgement of the fact
that lawyers work for money, would adversely affect the professionalism of lawyers.243 It also rejected the view that attorney advertising was inherently misleading. Although advertising claims
may be incomplete, the assumption that consumers will necessarily
be misled rests on the proposition that "the public is not sophisticated enough to realize the limitations of advertising, and that the
public is better kept in ignorance than trusted with correct but
incomplete information.

' 24 4

The Court believed that that proposi-

tion underestimated the ability of the public and expressed its dubiety about "any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance." 45 In the Court's opinion, the way to offset
consumer ignorance is "more disclosure, rather than less.

' 24 6

The Court in Bates, as it had in Virginia Board of Pharmacy,
made it clear that government may regulate false, deceptive, or
misleading advertising.2 47 Given the public's lack of sophistication
in areas of professional services, some forms of advertising might
be inappropriate because they are so susceptible to misinterpretation and so difficult to measure or verify. For example, claims as to
quality of professional services, not adjudicated in Bates, might be
"so likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction.

'248

Thus, the

Court recognized the difficulty of drawing lines between deceptive
and nondeceptive advertising; but because of the importance of
commercial information to the proper functioning of the market
system, the Court required that such lines be drawn on a case-bycase basis over time.249
After Virginia Board of Pharmacy and Bates no outright ban
on professional price advertising for routine services can be toler242. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 367-68 (1977). See generally Canby & Gellhorn,
Physician Advertising: The First Amendment and the Sherman Act, 1978 DuKE L.J. 543.
243. 433 U.S. at 371-72.
244. Id. at 374-75.
245. Id. at 375.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 383.
248. Id. at 383-84.
249. Id. at 384.
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ated under the first amendment. Not all commercial expression,
however, will be immune from governmental regulation. If a particular form of advertising does not mislead or is not related to an
unlawful activity, it is within the ambit of protected expression. In
order to justify regulation of advertising, the state must show that
it has a substantial interest at stake. In addition, it must demonstrate that the regulation directly furthers that substantial interest
and does so in a way that is least intrusive on the right of free
2 50
expression.

What the commercial speech cases establish, on a constitutional foundation, is the principle that professionals have a right to
promote and advertise the prices of their services and that consumers have a derivative right to receive that information in order
to make intelligent choices in the economic marketplace.25 1 The

first amendment protects, as a fundamental principle, the right of
market participants-both providers and consumers-to disseminate and receive commercial information. The paternalistic view
that quality will be compromised or that unsophisticated consumers will be unduly confused is rejected as at odds with the precepts
of the first amendment. These commercial speech cases provide an
important constitutional foundation upon which to build further
market-perfecting policies in the health sector, aimed at promoting
competition among providers and providing consumers with a better understanding of the array of choices available in the medical
marketplace.
B. The Doctrine of Informed Consent
Informed consumer choice is a cornerstone of any market-oriented strategy. In the health area, the dogma has been that patients do not and cannot understand enough about medical matters to make informed choices. Also the implicit assumption is
made that, when seeking medical assistance, patients are not inclined to shop around in a market. In short, patients are and want
250. Central Hudson Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 2354 (1980).
251. The Virginia Board of Pharmacycase was brought by consumers, not providers.
The first amendment right recognized in the case, therefore, was the derivative right of
consumers to receive information that providers, who were not parties to the lawsuit, might
wish to furnish. 425 U.S. at 754. For a discussion of the Federal Trade Commissions antitrust action against the American Medical Association's restrictions on solicitation and advertising, see Costillo, Competition Policy and the Medical Profession, 304 NEw ENG. J.
MED.1099 (1981).
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to be dependent, even helpless.2 5
The evolution of the commercial speech doctrine, as applied in
the medical context,2 53 suggests a very different model of patient
decisionmaking. It relies on the ability of patients or their intermediaries to seek out and act on information about the range of
choices in the marketplace. 2 " By encouraging discussion and dialogue about price information, the commercial speech doctrine facilitates the process of patient awareness and ultimately, patient
responsibility.
Although economic considerations are not the primary rationale for informed consent,25 5 the common law doctrine of informed
consent may perform much the same function as the commercial
speech doctrine in improving the flow of medical information to
patients.2 5 It could therefore facilitate more rational patient
choice and participation in medical decisionmaking.
The doctrine of informed consent 5 7 is founded on the principle, articulated by Judge Cardozo, that "[e]very human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body . . . . ,, The fundamental value protected by informed consent is individual autonomy.259 Protection
of that value in turn has two components-the actual agreement
of
by a person to a particular form of treatment and the disclosure
2 60
decisionmaking.
informed
allow
to
information
sufficient
Consent, when a patient can give it, 261 has long been an essen252. See generally Meisel, supra note 42, at 415-16 & nn.11 & 12.
253. See Canby & Gellhorn, supra note 242, at 546-64.
254. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 374-75 (1977); Virginia State Bd.of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
255. See generally Capron, Informed Consent in CatastrophicDisease Research and
Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. Rzv. 340, 364-76 (1974); Meisel, The Expansion of Liability fo:
Medical Accidents: From Negligence to Strict Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 56
NEB. L. RaV. 51, 77-86 (1977).
256. Actual empirical evidence on how the doctrine of informed consent affects physician disclosure and patient understanding is inconclusive. See generally A. RosOFF, INFORMED CONsENT:.A GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIERs 313-85 (1981); Meisel, supra note
42, at 427 n.61.
257. For a discussion of the statutory responses to court-created common law, see
Miller, Informed Consent: III, 244 J.A.M.A. 2556 (1980).
258. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hasp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914),
overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3
(1957).
259. Capron, supra note 255, at 364-65.
260. Id.
261. See Meisel, supra note 42.
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tial precondition to medical intervention.6 2 The requirement of
consent provides a form of operational protection to the patient's
right of bodily integrity.263 The doctrine of informed consent requires that the consent be based on adequate information.2 "
Since patients are typically not medical experts, they must
rely on their physicians for the information upon which to base
their decisions. Because of the nature of the doctor-patient relationship, in which the physician serves the patient in a fiduciary
capacity, the responsibility for informing the patient rests with the
physician. Otherwise, without knowledge of therapeutic alternatives and their risks, patients cannot exercise their right of choice
in an intelligent manner. The assumption is that a properly informed patient will be able to exercise a reasoned judgment, evaluating risks and benefits in consultation with the physician.2
The development of doctrine in the law of informed consent
has focused on the scope of the physician's obligation of disclosure.
The Kansas Supreme Court's formulation of the traditional rule is
still widely cited: "The duty of the physician to disclose .

.

. is

limited to those disclosures which a reasonable medical practi2
tioner would make under the same or similar circumstances." "

This so-called professional standard of disclosure, which apparently is still the majority rule,267 is premised on the view that
"[h]ow the physician may best discharge his obligation to the patient. . . involves primarily a question of medical judgment."2 8 In
other words, professionals, not patients, determine what risks
should be disclosed.
The professional standard of disclosure requires a plaintiff to
establish, by expert medical evidence, the existence of a duty to
disclose. 6 Under the professional standard, whether the duty exists at all depends on what similarly situated physicians would do
in like circumstances. This approach perpetuates the common paternalistic judgment that patients are unable or unwilling to become active participants in the medical decisionmaking process. By
262. See J. KING, THE LAw OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 136 (1977); J. LUDLAM, INFORMED
CONSENT 19 (1978).
263. Pratt v. Davis, 118 IMI.App. 161, 166 (1905), aff'd, 244 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
264. See J. KING, supra note 262, at 152.
265. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 n.27 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972).
266. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 409, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960).
267. See J. KING, supra note 262, at 155.
268. 186 Kan. at 409, 350 P.2d at 1106.
269. See A. ROSOFF, supra note 256, at 35.
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allowing providers to set the standard, this traditional view encourages provider paternalism and does nothing to lessen the inherent leverage providers have by virtue of their greater knowledge
and relative noninvolvement in a patient's medical problem. A provider's disinclination to share information, and thus, presumably,
power and responsibility, with a patient is reinforced; lack of information impairs patient participation in decisionmaking and helps
to establish provider dominance. At the same time, by inhibiting
rather than nurturing active patient involvement, the traditional
approach undermines the societal interest in increased patient understanding, a precondition to a more effectively functioning market in the health sector.7 0
In 1972, the seminal decision in Canterbury v. Spence"' rejected the professional standard as the basis for disclosure to patients. The Canterbury court refused to accept the position that
"the physician's obligation to disclose is either germinated or limited by medical practice. 2 72 Recognizing that tying the duty to
disclose to medical custom "arrogate[s] the decision . . . to the
physician alone, 2 7 3 the court held that "[r]espect for the patient's

right of self-determination on particular therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than
one which physicians
'274
may or may not impose on themselves.

In short, under Canterbury the physician's duty to disclose
stems from the "patient's right of self-decision.

27

5

Since "ofttimes

judgment"276

a nonmedical
is involved in determining what matters to disclose, "medical custom cannot furnish the test of its propriety. 2 7 7 The basis for disclosure, therefore, must be what infor-

mation a reasonable patient needs in order to make an intelligent
choice, not what professional practice would command or allow.
The Canterbury approach, though still a minority rule, was
followed in the same year by the Supreme Court of California in
Cobbs v. Grant278 and by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Wii270. See generally Meisel, supra note 42, at 418-29; Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed
Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 628 (1970); Note, supra note 41, at 1535-55.
271. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
272. Id. at 783.
273. Id. at 784.
274. Id. Accord, Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,
514 (1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 625, 295 A.2d 676, 688 (1972).
275. 464 F.2d at 786.
276. Id. at 785.
277. Id.
278. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
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kinson v. Vesey.2 79 In Cobbs the California court noted that patients generally are not knowledgeable about medical matters and
accordingly depend on physicians for information. Since patients
have the right to control their bodily integrity-"to determine
whether or not to submit to lawful medical treatment"-patient
consent is necessary. For that consent to be effective, it must be
based on adequate information.2 80 The duty under Cobbs to disclose "all information relevant to a meaningful decisional process"2 81 follows from those premises.
In Wilkinson the Rhode Island court recognized that the
"keystone" of informed consent doctrine is the right of every competent adult "to forego treatment, or even cure, if it entails what
for him are intolerable consequences or risks however unwise his
sense of values may be in the eyes of the medical profession, or
even the community. 2 82 Protection of the right requires that a patient be able to make a rational decision in light of his "individual
value judgment,"2 8' 8 and that the decision about disclosure not be
left to a professional standard. Rather, the physician bears the
burden of proving that nondisclosure is in the best interest of the
patient.2 84
Under the Canterbury-Cobbs-Wilkinson approach, then, the
patient's need for disclosure controls. The duty to disclose encompasses all "material" information, including "all risks potentially
affecting the decision. '285 The nature and extent of information
deemed "material" is determined under Canterbury by an objective standard: what risks "a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be
likely to attach significance to . . . in deciding whether or not to
forego the proposed therapy. '2 86 In Cobbs the court arguably suggested a subjective standard to determine materiality:287 "The
scope of the physician's communications to the patient. . . must
be measured by the patient's need .... ,,2" Although Cobbs cited
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
8 Cal. 3d at 242, 502 P.2d at 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
Id. at 242, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
110 R.I. at 624, 295 A.2d at 687.
Id.
Id. at 624, 295 A.2d at 687-88.
°

285. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-87 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972).

286. Id. at 787 (quoting Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 270, at 640).
287. See Capron, supra note 255, at 407.
288. 8 Cal. 3d at 245, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
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Canterbury for this view, the Cobbs formulation, unlike that of
Canterbury,can be read as focusing more clearly on the individual
patient's needs in a particular circumstance. The court in Wilkin89 It
son appeared to embrace Canterbury's objective standard.
also recognized, however, the individual patient's right to make a
decision even if the patient's own values are at odds with those of
the medical or general community. That right suggests that subjective considerations are not irrelevant under Wilkinson.
Although there are still unresolved doctrinal issues with the
"reasonable person" approach to informed consent, and apparently
some question about its empirical effect,290 the emerging formulation has extremely important potential significance for the market
strategy. On a normative basis, the approach thrusts more responsibility for decisionmaking on the patient-consumer, suggesting
greater individual responsibility for the making of choices in health
matters. Also, it provides an incentive for providers to share more
authority and information with consumers. This increased sharing
could help restore balance to the doctor-patient relationship and
encourage patients to become more active and knowledgeable as
consumers. The reasonable person approach could also diminish
the "shamanism"2 9 1 aspect of medical practice by requiring doctors
to have a sound basis for their treatment recommendations. 9 2 In
any event, it vests ultimate authority in the patient and thus helps
restructure the doctor-patient relationship by giving the patient
added information and thus the capacity to exercise more
authority.
In practice, some may object to the requirement for additional
disclosure because of its potential cost. The communication of information is time-consuming and could mean lower productivity
for physicians. At least three responses to this concern are possible. First, the extra cost may be worthwhile. This is difficult to
assess at this stage, however, and we would be hesitant to endorse
the Canterbury approach on that basis. Second, cost-reducing possibilities exist. A patient who feels no need or desire for more in289. 110 R.I. at 627-28, 295 A.2d at 689.
290. See Meisel, supra note 42, at 427 n.61; A. RoSOFF, supra note 256, at 313. For an
argument that there should be an obligation of patient comprehension as well as disclosure,
see Capron, supra note 255, at 410-18. But see Meisel, Letter to the Editor, 245 J.A.M.A.
921-22 (1981).
291. See Avorn, The Future of Doctoring, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1974, at 7179.
292.

Note, supra note 41, at 1541-55. See generally A. COCHRANs, EFFECTIVENEss
SERvicas (1972).
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volvement in decisionmaking and who wishes to remain dependent
can waive his Canterbury-type rights to disclosure.2 9 3 The physi-

cian's information costs would decrease, and he might well be persuaded to lower his fee for such a patient. Additionally, physicians
can delegate the information-conveying function to allied health
professionals, whose time would be less expensive. Indeed, we see
this as an extremely valuable task for expanded-role nurses to perform.19 4 Use of physician-extenders in this manner could mitigate

the cost implications of the Canterbury standard of informed
consent.
Last, from a pragmatic perspective, expanding patient participation in medical decisionmaking could decrease malpractice
claims. On one level, increased patient participation in decisionmaking may discourage lawsuits by disgruntled patients about application of an appropriate standard of care. The courts might be
persuaded to develop a deferential attitude toward a particular
standard of practice if a fully informed and knowledgeable patient
has acquiesced to that standard. 9 If informed patients assume
more responsibility in diagnosis and treatment decisionmaking, it
is reasonable to assign more weight to decisions made jointly with
their physician about a given course of treatment. In sum, the reasonable patient approach to informed consent is a promising common-law doctrinal development that complements and could facilitate and justify the establishment of a freer market in the health
sector.
C. Antitrust Doctrine
The antitrust laws are a form of government intervention
designed to promote, not forestall, competition. Properly implemented, they are an important procompetitive force in the economy-discouraging anticompetitive conduct, encouraging competitive behavior, and, institutionally, keeping the structure of the
marketplace intact to enable the normal competitive process to
operate.

296

293. See Meisel, supra note 42, at 453-60.
294. See Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra note 22, at 386.
295.

See generally Epstein, supra note 64, at 87, 119-28 & 126-27 n.80.

296.

See generally United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972), which

states,
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta
of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and
our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental

1981]

A DOSE OF COMPETITION

909

It would be unnecessarily duplicative to discuss in detail the
emerging antitrust issues relating to the health field since that is
done elsewhere in this Symposium 29 7 and in other fora.2 98 Here the

focus is on the erosion of three threshold barriers that at one time
forestalled the development of antitrust doctrine in the health
field: (1) the demise of the so-called "learned profession" exemption for medical practice and related services; (2) the expansion of
the notion of interstate commerce, which has in effect broadened
the Sherman Act's jurisdictional reach; and (3) the modification of
the rule, first announced in Parker v. Brown, 99 that the Sherman
Act barred private anticompetitive activity but not state regulatory
action.
1. The Learned Professions Exemption
Antitrust doctrine has developed relatively slowly in the
health services context. The sense that the medical sector somehow
did not conform to normal economic market forces was reinforced
by the assumption that the practice of medicine was a "learned
profession" and as such was not covered by the federal antitrust
laws, which apply to "trade or commerce.

3 00

The "learned profes-

years,301

but was not squarely faced by the
sion" issue lingered for
Supreme Court until Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar302 was decided
in 1975.
Goldfarb involved a challenge under the Sherman Act to a
minimum fee schedule for lawyers promulgated by a county bar
association and enforced by the Virginia State Bar.30 3 The Bar
personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter
how small, is the freedom to compete-to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and
ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster. Implicit in such freedom is the
notion that it cannot be foreclosed with respect to one sector of the economy because
certain private citizens or groups believe that such foreclosure might promote greater
competition in a more important sector of the economy.
297. See Bovbjerg, Competition Versus Regulation in Medical Care: An Overdrawn
Dichotomy, 34 VAND. L. REv. 965 (1981); Leibenluft & Pollard, Antitrust Scrutiny of the

Health Professions:Developing a Framework for Assessing PrivateRestraints, 34 VMi rD. L.
REv. 927 (1981).
298.
299.

See generally Symposium, 1978 DuKE L.J. 303-697.
317 U.S. 341 (1943).

300. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 773
(1975).
301. See Blumstein & Calvani, State Action as a Shield and a Sword in a Medical
Services Antitrust Context: Parker v. Brown in ConstitutionalPerspective,1978 DUKE L.J.
389, 390 n.2.
302. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
303. Id. at 775.
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sought total exclusion from Sherman Act coverage on the ground
that the practice of law, as a learned profession, was not "trade or
commerce" under the Act.3 04 The Fourth Circuit had accepted the
Bar's defense, ostensibly because of the type of regulation states
typically impose on the professions. The court reasoned that certain forms of competition are incompatible with professional regulation. Consequently the Fourth Circuit held that balancing the
conflicting policies of competition and professional regulation required an exemption from the Sherman Act for the practice of
05
law.
In reversing, the Supreme Court rejected any "sweeping exclusion"306 for learned professions from the coverage of the antitrust
laws. Such a broad exemption would conflict with the congressional
goal of legislating as extensively as it could against anticompetitive
activities.3 0 7 Moreover, the Court saw "no disparagement of the
practice of law as a profession to acknowledge that it has ... [a]
business aspect," 8 ' especially since "lawyers play an important
part in commercial intercourse, and. . . anticompetitive activities
by lawyers may exert a restraint on commerce." 30 9
The emphasis on the role of lawyers in "commercial intercourse" suggested to some that a narrower exemption from the antitrust laws for selected learned professions might still be carved
out, despite Goldfarb's rejection of a sweeping exemption for all
learned professions. A footnote to the Goldfarb opinion reinforced
that belief.3 10 In that footnote, Chief Justice Burger noted that
professions should not be viewed as wholly interchangeable with
other forms of business for purposes of the antitrust laws. Thus,
antitrust concepts developed in a commercial context should not
be applied by rote to all professional activities. The Court "intimate[d] no view on any other situation than the one with which [it
was] confronted.
... 1 The Court did assert, however, that the
differences between the professions and other commercial activities
could affect the substantive application of antitrust doctrine in the
different professional context; any differences, though, would not
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id. at 787.
Id. at 779-80.
Id. at 787.
Id.
Id. at 788.
Id.
Id. at 788 n.17.
Id.
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serve as a basis for a threshold exemption for any particular proalone,
fession because "[t]he nature of an occupation, standing
312
Act.
Sherman
the
from
does not provide sanctuary
The Court's subsequent decision in National Society of Pro3 makes the meaning of the
fessional Engineers v. United States""
Goldfarb footnote clearer. Apparently no argument for a total
exemption was even made in Professional Engineers; rather, the
Society argued that its canon of ethics, which prohibited competitive bidding,314 was reasonable under the Sherman Act.3 1 5
In holding the canon illegal, the Court rejected the position
that "because of the special characteristics of a particular industry,
monopolistic arrangements will better promote trade and commerce than competition. 3 1 6 If an exemption for specific industries
817
is to exist, the Court felt, Congress must expressly confer it.
Thus, the antitrust Rule of Reason doctrine does not confer a special exemption on the professions; the validity of an act depends
on its "impact on competitive conditions."3 1 8 Promotion of competition is the policy of the Sherman Act, and an activity that suppresses competition violates the Act.
The Court in ProfessionalEngineers made it clear that a restraint on commerce will be examined to determine its "competitive significance. ' 3 1 9 Even when professional activity is involved,
however, the Court will not question "whether a policy favoring
competition is in the public interest."3 20 The antitrust laws, as applied in the professional as well as the commercial context, seek to
promote competition. Accordingly, an anticompetitive professional
restraint cannot be justified on the ground that competition poses
a potential threat to public safety or to the ethics of the profession.3 21 In reasoning closely parallel to that in the commercial exthe Court held that the Sherman Act adopted a
pression cases,
competitive approach and to allow anticompetitive professional ac312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Id. at 787.
435 U.S. 679 (1978).
Id. at 681.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 689.
Id. at 689-90.
Id. at 690.
Id. at 692.
Id.
Id. at 695.
See text accompanying notes 223-51 supra.
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tivity as a "reasonable method of forestalling ... public harm 3 23
would constitute "nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic
3 24
[procompetition] policy of the Sherman Act.
After Goldfarb and ProfessionalEngineers, then, it is clear
that the practice of medicine is not totally exempt from the antitrust laws, and the Seventh Circuit has explicitly so held. 2 5 Moreover, in the commercial expression area, the Supreme Court has
rejected the paternalistic view that people will be unable to make
reasoned consumer judgments when provided with commercial information. This dual stance by the Court reflects the societal decision to rely on the right of consumers to make informed choices
and of providers to compete in a free marketplace. The protection
of commercial expression under the first amendment-the provider's right to advertise and the consumer's right to receive commercial information-assumes that consumers will be able to decide what is in their own best interests. The first amendment
protects the system of free expression and allows outcomes to derive from private decentralized choices. Similarly, the decisions in
Goldfarb and Professional Engineers adopt the view that under
the Sherman Act competition is the norm in the economic marketplace. Arguments that anticompetitive professional conduct somehow promotes the public interest "by preventing ... inferior work
and by insuring ethical behavior"3 8 are unacceptable. The Sherman Act protects the system of competition and, like the first
amendment, allows outcomes to derive from private decentralized
choices. As in the commercial speech context, however, regulations
designed to facilitate competition might well pass muster. The peculiarities of professional activities might well play an important
role in that type of a Rule of Reason analysis.
2.

The Interstate Commerce Requirement

Since the constitutional source of authority underlying the
Sherman Act is the commerce clause, 27 the Act's jurisdictional
reach is confined to anticompetitive restraints "among the several
states. 3 28 As the scope of federal power under the commerce
clause has expanded, the Supreme Court has "permitted the reach
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

435 U.S. at 687.
Id. at 695.
See Williams v. St. Joseph Hosp., 629 F.2d 448, 453 (7th Cir. 1980).
435 U.S. at 693-94.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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of the Sherman Act to expand" as well,'3

9

largely out of a sense

that Congress intended that the Sherman Act reach to the maximum extent of federal constitutional authority.330
Thus, the Sherman Act extends to activities that either are
"in" interstate commerce or substantially "affect" interstate commerce.33 1 Goldfarb was analyzed as an "in" commerce case.33 2 The
Goldfarb plaintiffs alleged anticompetitive conduct by lawyers
whom they sought to employ to perform a title search necessary to
obtain title insurance for a home.333 The Court noted that a significant amount of home loan financing funds came from out-of-state
sources and that federal government programs guaranteed a significant amount of loans on real estate in the area. Thus, home
purchase transactions, which create the need for title searches, are
in interstate commerce, and title searches themselves are an integral, necessary, and inseparable part of those real estate
38
transactions. '

While the Goldfarb Court stated that the legal services involved in that case had a sufficient effect on interstate commerce
to satisfy the Sherman Act's jurisdictional requirements, the Court
subsequently held in McLain v. Real Estate Boards5 that Goldfarb was analyzed as an "in" commerce not an "effect on commerce" case.336 By citing to Wickard v. Filburn3 17 one of the most

far-reaching commerce clause cases, the Court in McLain made it
clear that the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act would be as
"correspondingly broad"33 8 as Congress' constitutional power. McLain involved an allegation of price fixing and other anticompetitive practices on the part of New Orleans real estate brokers. 3
The evidence of the practices' effect on interstate commerce concerned out-of-state financing of real estate transactions, including
raising funds from out-of-state investors, trading mortgages as
financial instruments in the interstate market for secondary mort329. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 739, 743 n.2 (1976).
330. See McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980); Blumstein & Calvani,
supra note 301, at 420.
331. McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 241-46 (1980); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp
Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974).
332. McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 243-44 (1980).
333. 421 U.S. at 775-76.
334. Id. at 783-85.
335. 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
336. Id. at 243-44.
337. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
338. 444 U.S. at 241.
339. Id. at 235.
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gages, and participating in federal lending programs "which entailed interstate transfers of premiums and settlements. 3 0 The
Court also noted that a relationship with the "interstate movement
of people"'3 4' would also suffice for purposes of applying the Sherman Act.
The decisions in McLain and Hospital Building Co. v. Rex
Hospital Trustees" are the most important recent "effect on commerce" rulings for purposes of applying the Sherman Act to the
health sector. In Rex Hospital defendants were charged with an
unlawful conspiracy to restrain trade by furnishing medical and
surgical hospital services and to monopolize the hospital business
in Raleigh, North Carolina. Plaintiff, a for-profit hospital, alleged
that defendant, a nonprofit hospital, illegally conspired to block
plaintiff's plans for expansion and relocation. Defendant's alleged
goal was to "monopolize the business of providing compensated
medical and surgical services in the Raleigh area." 4 Reversing the
Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that plaintiff had stated a
cause of action by alleging facts which, if proved, could have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.u4 Plaintiff alleged that it
purchased medicines and supplies from out-of-state companies, derived revenues from out-of-state insurance companies and from
Medicaid and Medicare, and received a large portion of its con34 5
struction financing from out-of-state lenders.
Reading Goldfarb, Rex Hospital, and McLain together, one
can conclude that most anticompetitive hospital activities will pass
the "effect on commerce" threshold test because at least some of
the following factors exist in virtually all hospital construction or
operation situations: (1) construction financing, which includes significant sums from out-of-state lenders; (2) purchases of equipment, medication, and other goods and services from out-of-state
suppliers;348 (3) third-party reimbursements for significant numbers of patients from private insurance carriers or from federal
programs such as Medicaid or Medicare;3 47 and (4) out-of-state pa340.

Id. at 245.

341.

Id.

342. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
343. Id. at 741.
344. Id. at 743-44.
345. Id. at 741, 744.
346. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
347. The allegation about the third-party financing in Rex Hospital was not specifically mentioned by the Court in its discussion. See Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v.
Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 540 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978). Both McLain and Goldfarb, however,
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tient referrals both to and from a particular hospital. 4
Similarly, one can safely predict that most anticompetitive activities by groups of doctors will be deemed to have a substantial
effect on commerce for Sherman Act purposes. 3' 9 Although physicians may not need large construction financing, Goldfarb and McLain suggest that borrowing in even moderate amounts can be sufficient to pass the necessary jurisdictional threshold under the
Sherman Act, especially since the trading of financial instruments
in an interstate secondary mortgage market is considered a practi2 50 As for the other
cal economic effect on commerce under McLain.
factors, they will likely be present with respect to physicians as
well as hospitals in varying degrees. Most physicians who utilize
hospital facilities receive compensation from Medicaid, Medicare,
or private insurers, receive or make patient referrals out of state,
or purchase equipment, drugs, supplies, or services from out-ofstate sources.
Thus, it now seems likely that the vast bulk of potentially illegal anticompetitive practices involving institutional and individual
providers will fall within the purview of the federal antitrust
laws.3 5 1 This expansion of the antitrust laws' jurisdiction may curtail a good deal of anticompetitive conduct and may provide an
avenue of redress for those whose competitive efforts are forestalled by collective action of entrenched provider interests. 52
3.

The Effect of State Action

Regulatory action by state, local, or regional governmental entities can affect antitrust liability in two quite different ways. In
suggest that federal loan guarantee programs for real estate transactions constitute a substantial nexus to interstate commerce in the Sherman Act context. See McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 245 (1980); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 783 (1975).

348. Again, this factor was raised by plaintiff in Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. at 741, but not
specifically discussed by the Court. Id. at 744. The Court in McLain, however, explicitly
invited plaintiffs to offer evidence about "the interstate movement of people" as a basis for
Sherman Act jurisdiction. 444 U.S. at 245. See also Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 255-56 (1964); Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d

530, 540 (5th Cir. 1978).
349. See American Med. Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528-33 (1943), which
implicitly involved this issue.
350.

444 U.S. at 245.

351.
352.

See Williams v. St. Joseph Hosp., 629 F.2d 448, 453 (7th Cir. 1980).
See generally Goldberg & Greenberg, The Effect of Physician-ControlledHealth

Insurance: U.S. v. Oregon State Medical Society, 2 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 48 (1977);

Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing,1978 DUKE
L.J. 303.
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some circumstances, it can confer an exemption from the Sherman
Act's coverage. In other situations, however, the state may confer
market power on a group to such an extent that activity that is
otherwise legal may be found illegal under the antitrust laws. 5 3
(a) State Action as an Exemption
In Parker v. Brown3 " the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act applied to "individual and not state action."3 5 The Court
assumed that the state regulatory program challenged in Parker
would have been illegal under the antitrust laws if organized and
enforced by private parties.3 56 Because the state program "derived
its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the
state, '5 7 however, and because the Sherman Act contained no express statement that it was designed "to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature, 3 58 the
Court declined to infer a congressional "purpose that the antitrust
laws be used to strike down the State's regulatory program imposed as an act of government"3 59 in the absence of a clear and
manifest articulation of congressional intent.
In Parker cases, a basic distinction arises between situations
"when private parties are sued" and those "when governmental
programs or official conduct are challenged."3 0 Interestingly, every
case in which the Court has applied Parker immunity has involved
a state defendant.3 6 1 When a governmental official or agency is
sued, the fundamental issue raised is the proper "relationship between the sovereign States-and the antitrust laws. 36 2 In that context, the Parker issue raises concerns of federalism embodied in
the eleventh amendments36 -the susceptibility of states and state
353. Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 301, at 394-95. See generally Landes & Posner,
Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L. REv. 937, 956 n.35 (1981).
354. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
355. Id. at 352.
356. Id. at 350.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 350-51.
359. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 406 n.33 (1978).
360. Blumstein, A Prolegomenon to Growth Management and Exclusionary Zoning
Issues, LAw & CONTsEM. PROB., Spring 1979, at 5, 101.
361. Id. at 102 n.722 and cases cited therein.
362. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 587 (1976).
363. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI provides that "[tihe Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted

against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State."
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officers acting in their official capacities to suit in federal court for
possible federal antitrust liability.""e
Although no Supreme Court case has held that private parties
are exempt from the Sherman Act under Parker,65 a bare majority
of the Court does seem to accept the view that the state can confer
Parker immunity on private parties.36 6 Nevertheless, Parkermakes
it clear that "a state does not give immunity to those who violate
the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring
that their action is lawful ....,,"67 Thus, not all state action can
confer immunity or is itself immune from the federal antitrust
laws.
A proper analysis in Parker cases, then, has two dimensions: it
must account for eleventh amendment sovereign immunity concerns and tenth amendment federalism concerns centered on the
integrity of state government. The first question in the analysis
should be "whether the act of the political subdivision (or state
agency) 'is that of the state as sovereign.' "368 To determine the
answer to that question, which is closely akin to an eleventh
amendment analysis,3 6 the Court will consider whether the anticompetitive restraint is "one clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy. 3 70 The second inquiry should focus on
the nature and magnitude of the state's interest in its regulatory
policy.37 1 This aspect of Parker immunity is closely related to the
tenth amendment 72 federalism concerns reflected in National
7s
League of Cities v. Usery.3
The tenth amendment protects certain reserved powers of the states, and this component of Parker
immunity seems designed to respect sovereign state regulatory
functions. Three elements drawn from Usery should shape this
364. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW I 217al (1978); Blumstein &
Calvani, supra note 301, at 414-15.
365. See Blumstein, supra note 360, at 102 n.722.
366. See Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 301, at 419.
367. 317 U.S. at 351. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 104 (1980).
368. Blumstein, supra note 360, at 107; see City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978).
369. E.g., Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
370. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978). See
also California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980).
371. See Blumstein, supra note 360, at 103.
372. U.S. CONST. amend. X provides, "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
373. 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976).
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part of the Parker analysis. "[F]irst, there must be an attribute of
sovereignty involved; second, the state activity must be an essenand third, there must be an impairment
tial government function;
37 4
of that function.

'

The Supreme Court's most recent Parker decision, California
Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,3 7 5 al-

though not couched in constitutional terms, established a twostrand analysis similar to the one proposed. First, the Court required that the activity be a "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed ... state policy,"37 6 implicitly an eleventh amendment
standard. To qualify for Parker immunity, a political subdivision
must show "that the legislature contemplated the kind of action
complained of.

'3 77

The essential point is that a municipality or

other subdivision must show that it "acted as the agent of the
state, effectuating' 78state-initiated policies, in performing the chal3
lenged activities.
Second, Midcal requires that the state policy be "actively supervised" by the state itself.37 9 The active supervision provision
ensures that state sovereignty interests are truly at stake, since
Parker "exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an
act of government by the State as sovereign.

38 0

The Court's ap-

proach in Midcal, then, is consistent with the proposed tenth
amendment analysis. Under the proposed analysis, the Court
would examine
whether the exercise of governmental authority constituted an attribute of
sovereignty and promoted an essential governmental function. Also, there
must be a finding of an impairment of traditional governmental sovereign
functions. Presumably, no such impairment exists unless the state can show
that no reasonable, less anticompetitive alternative exists by which it can further its goals." 1

Thus, Parker immunity for nongovernmental defendants could be
justified if "necessary" to make a regulatory program function 82-- that is, if "essential to avoid an impairment of a tradi374.
375.
376.
377.

ing City
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 301, at 424.
445 U.S. 97 (1980).
Id. at 105.
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978) (quot-

of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976)).
Blumstein, supra note 360, at 104.
445 U.S. at 105.
435 U.S. at 413.
Blumstein, supra note 360, at 107.
See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 597 (1976).
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tional sovereign function."3 83
Applying this analytical framework to the field of health facilities regulation, one immediately must draw a distinction based on
the identity of the defendant. If a state agency CON decision is
involved, no eleventh amendment problem exists because the
agency is unquestionably acting on behalf of the state. To satisfy
the tenth amendment element of Parker immunity, the state must
be able to show that the CON program was intended and administered to promote an "attribute of sovereignty"-that is, a valid police power objective.3 84 A challenging party could attempt to show
that the alleged purpose of the program or of the agency's action
was private protectionism, not a legitimate public purpose;38 5 but
that is an extremely difficult burden for a plaintiff to carry.3 86
If a legitimate police power goal-that is, an "attribute of sovereignty"-is demonstrated, then the regulatory scheme is exempt
if it promotes a sufficiently important ("essential") state function.
A state policy of displacing "unfettered business freedom in the
matter of the establishment and relocation"38s 7 of hospital capital
facilities and equipment clearly satisfies that criterion, especially
when the strong federal CON policy is taken into consideration.
Finally, to justify Parker exemption, an impairment of a
state's essential function must occur. Since states have a degree of
freedom in establishing regulatory regimes, 3 88 it would seem that
the very essence of Parker immunity is to preserve the integrity of
state regulatory programs that carry out fundamental state policies. Thus, the conclusion of Professor Frances Miller seems correct: "As long as the State Agency continues to evaluate independently the merits of CON proposals and as long as those proposals
reasonably further the state's legitimate regulatory objectives, the
Parker doctrine should preclude antitrust liability" for the agency
itself. 9 Furthermore, it seems that the regulatory program's
proper functioning would be impaired if private parties could not
obey determinations made by the state agency. Thus, private parties should likewise be exempt, if they also satisfied the require383. Blumstein, supra note 360, at 108.
384. Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 301, at 424.
385. Id.
386. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
387. Id. at 109.
388. New Motor Vehicle Bd.v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
389. Miller, Antitrust and Certificates of Need: Health Systems Agencies, the Planning Act, and Regulatory Capture, 68 GEo. L.J. 873, 898 (1980).
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ment articulated in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.390 that "the
state's participation in a decision [must be] so dominant that it
would be unfair to hold a private party responsible for his conduct
implementing it." '' As Professor Miller recognized,39 2 the Parker
issue is more difficult to resolve in the context of areawide programs like health systems agencies (HSAs) because both the tenth
and eleventh amendment components of the analysis must be considered. Much will depend on the particular provisions of the
state's CON legislation and the peculiar factual circumstances3 93 in
which alleged anticompetitive conduct arises.
(b) State Action as ConferringMarket Power
Interestingly, the involvement of government action can make
some private conduct more rather than less susceptible to an antitrust challenge. Governmental regulatory action-for example,
CON programs-that creates artificial scarcity can result in added
market power for some private interests. If that increased market
control is used to restrain competition, antitrust liability could
follow. 3 94
Two situations illustrate the problem. The first involves tying
arrangements;9 5 the second concerns access to scarce "resource[s]
necessary to success of a particular trade or business." s96
"A tie-in is an attempt by a seller to link the sale of one item
to the simultaneous sale of another, separate item. 397 A heuristic
example is a hospital's hypothetical decision to limit flowers sent
390. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
391. Id. at 594-95.
392. Miller, supra note 389, at 898.
393. Compare National Gerimedical Hosp. and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross, 628
F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 4672 (1981) and Huron valley Hosp., Inc. v.
City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. Mich. 1979) with Feminist Women's Health Center
v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court decision in National Gerimedical was not handed down until after this Article was printed and therefore is not
discussed.
In May 1980, the United States Department of Justice indicated that, in exercising its
prosecutorial discretion, it would view HSA decisions on CON, appropriateness review, and
grant application review as valid. It would not express a definitive judgment with respect to
HSA activities involved in seeking to implement a Health System Plan or an Annual Implementation Plan. See Letter of Sanford M. Litvack to William G. Kopit, Esq., (May 6, 1980).
394. See Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 301, at 431-37. For an interesting theoretical attempt to define market power as a concept, see Landes & Posner, supra note 353.
395. See Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 301, at 431-37.
396. Calvani & James, Antitrust Law and the Practiceof Medicine, 2 J. LEGAL MED.
75, 81 (1980).
397. Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 301, at 432.
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to inpatients to those purchased in the official hospital florist shop.
Clearly, the goal of this tying arrangement is to use market power
with respect to one transaction to increase sales for the tied
product.
Existing antitrust doctrine bars tying arrangements provided a
plaintiff can show three things: (1) an effect on commerce that is
"not insubstantial;"89 8 (2) the tying and tied goods are separate,
distinct products;3 99 and (3) market power in the tying product exists so that the seller has "some advantage not shared by... com' 40 0
petitors in the market for the tying product.
If one assumes that the first two necessary showings can be
made, 0 1 the analytical issue of the existence of market power in
the tying product remains; that is, a court must decide "whether
the seller has the power, within the market for the tying product,
to raise prices or to require purchasers to accept burdensome terms
' 40 2
that could not be exacted in a completely competitive market.
The "uniqueness" of a product may create this type of market
power if an element of exclusiveness exists: "[u]niqueness confers
economic power only when other competitors are in some way prevented from offering the distinctive product themselves. Such barriers may be legal, as in the case of patented and copyrighted products,.., or physical, as when the product is land .... )P403
CON legislation, by restricting the opportunity for health care
institutions to purchase equipment or expand facilities, may add to
the market power of some providers. Thus, an institution with "either equipment or facilities for which others cannot obtain a certificate will have market power" 404 that might serve as a basis for an
adverse finding of antitrust liability. In sum, a CON might be "sufficiently analogous to the patent and copyright laws to justify a
finding of uniqueness that confers market power." 40 5
398. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
399. See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495
(1969) (Fortner1); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
400. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977)
(FortnerI1).
401. See Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 301, at 433-35.
402. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977)
(FortnerI).
403. Id. at 621 (quoting Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394
U.S. 495, 505 n.2 (1969) (Fortner )).
404. Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 301, at 435.
405. Id. at 436. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) ("requisite
economic power is presumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted.") See generally Calvani & James, supra note 396, at 81-83, 85-89.
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The problem of access to hospital privileges provides the other
heuristic example of the potential antitrust effect of governmental
regulatory action through CON. Although courts traditionally have
not carefully scrutinized hospital decisions on staff privileges, 0 6
"[a] very respectable case can be made" that anticompetitive barriers to hospital staff privileges violate the antitrust laws when a
doctor's practice requires access to hospital facilities or
equipment. 0 7
Three Supreme Court cases suggest a line of analysis. In Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States40 8 a power company owned the
only power subtransmission lines in an area. It refused to sell potential competitors power at wholesale prices and also declined to
"wheel" power to its potential competitors from other suppliers of
wholesale energy.4 0 9 The Supreme Court upheld a district court decree that ordered Otter Tail either to sell power at wholesale prices
or to "wheel" power from other sources to cities and towns that
sought to supply their own power. 41 0 The Court noted that "Otter
Tail's refusals to sell at wholesale or to wheel were solely to prevent municipal power systems from eroding its monopolistic position. ' 411 It declared that a company cannot use its monopoly power
"to foreclose competition or gain a competitive advantage, or to
destroy a competitor ....
Otter Tail involved the use by one company of its market
power-control of a unique resource-to prevent competitive entry. To remedy the situation Otter Tail was required to allow use
of its subtransmission lines by potential competitors for whom the
use was necessary for entry into and participation in the market.
Otter Tail seemed to build on two earlier cases, both of which
41 3
involved group activity. In Associated Press v. United States
the Supreme Court held that "the news-gathering organization,
membership in which conferred a substantial competitive advantage, could not discriminate against those applicants for membership who competed with existing members."'4 1' The bylaws of the
Associated Press (AP) prohibited AP members from selling news
406. See Calvani & James, supra note 396, at 77.
407. Id. at 81.
408. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
409. Id. at 371.
410. Id. at 375.
411. Id. at 378.
412. Id. at 377.
413. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
414. HI P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTrrRUST LAW I 729g, at 242-43 (1978).
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to nonmembers and granted members the authority to block nonmember competitors from membership.415 The purpose of the bylaw provision was anticompetitive. 18 Concluding that the actual
effect of the bylaws was not controlling, the Court held them illegal
on their face. While the AP could limit admission, it could not do
so on a discriminatory or anticompetitive basis.417 United States v.
Terminal Railroad Association41 8 also involved joint action by a
group of competing railroads to control all economical access
routes into St. Louis. The Court held that exclusion of some competitors from the group was illegal because of the critical importance of the facilities to the excluded competitors. Accordingly, it
ordered that competing companies be allowed to join the group or
otherwise to use the facilities on a nondiscriminatory basis. 19
Otter Tail, Associated Press, and Terminal Railroad suggest
that when, either individually or by group action, a competitor
controls some unique resource, access to which is essential for
other competitors, the controlling competitor must provide its rivals nondiscriminatory access to the resource. This principle may
apply to the medical sector. Governmental regulation through
CON is designed to avoid the proliferation of medical facilities and
equipment. Rational resource allocation under CON may result in
specialization, whereby one institution emphasizes one service and
another a different service. When a "physician's practice requires
access to facilities or equipment that has been limited to a particular institution by virtue of certificate of need, the uniqueness of
the asset may underscore the necessity of open access to it by all
420
firms in the market.'

In the hospital context, the principle of nondiscriminatory access need not require the granting of staff privileges to all practitioners. Terminal Railroad suggests the possibility of allowing
competitors to use facilities in certain circumstances without
granting general privileges. Associated Press suggests that a hospital can limit its staff size, provided that the criteria for membership are not discriminatory or anticompetitive. Otter Tail reinforces that idea, since the decree conferring access in that case
included a provision that Otter Tail be allowed to charge "rates
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.

326 U.S. at 4.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 21.
224 U.S. 383 (1912).
Id. at 408-09.
Calvani & James, supra note 396, at 83.
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Thus, no institution will be obliged to

open its doors to such an extent that it suffers economically from
the proliferation of practitioners, provided that the resulting economic harm is not the result of normal competitive factors.
Finally, Otter Tail, Associated Press, and Terminal Railroad
all involved findings of anticompetitive intent underlying the respective access restrictions. In the hospital context, such findings
may be more difficult to make. More likely, restrictive access decisions will be couched in terms of quality assurance. For example,
hospitals may specify criteria such as board certification or board
eligibility as a basis for granting privileges. As hospitals face
broadened institutional liability for malpractice by nonemployee
providers who practice in the hospital, 4 22 their institutional claim
for a role in quality control grows stronger. Eventually, the courts
must determine how important the finding of purposeful anticompetitive conduct is. Absent overt anticompetitive behavior, the
courts may well accommodate the competing interests by carefully
scrutinizing the quality assurance argument 2 3 and, in considering
the feasibility of less anticompetitive alternatives, balance quality
considerations against the desirability of maintaining a competitive
system.
V. Conclusion
Is a dose of competition what the doctor should order? From
the above discussion, it should be clear that society has moved in
the direction of seriously considering market-oriented alternatives
to health care delivery, and we endorse this general change in policy orientation. In stating that a dose of competition is warranted,
we accept the guiding principle that both physicians and patients
should face meaningful financial incentives to make cost-effective
purchases in the medical marketplace. To make such decisions,
they must have adequate information. Although equality of access
to health care services may be an unattainable and undesirable objective, the principle that every citizen is entitled to a minimum
standard of care should be maintained.
421. 410 U.S. at 375.
422. E.g., Tucson Med. Center, Inc. v. Misevch, 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958 (1976);
Gridley v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1972). See also Darling v. Charleston Community
Memorial Hosp., 33 IM. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
423. See Blank v. Palo Alto-Stanford Hoasp. Center, 234 Cal. App. 2d 377, 385, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 572, 575 (1965). See also Dattilo v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 23 Ariz. App. 392, 396-97, 533
P.2d 700, 704-05 (1975).
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To foster competition does not mean to eliminate government's role in health care, but, again with reference to the Article's
title, rather to redefine it. There is a role for the state in assuring
that patients have ready access to truthful information about the
array of choices they face in the medical marketplace. State action
may be necessary to ensure that competitive efforts are not forestalled by collective actions of entrenched provider groups. Exercise of tax-transfer power is surely needed to assure all citizens access to a socially-desirable minimum level of health care services.
Certain governmentally-enforced rules may be necessary to assure
that the poor and the very sick are not placed at an undue disadvantage in a competitive environment.
At the same time, under competition, many governmental activities would be substantially reduced. There would be no reviews
of individual providers' charges or utilization patterns. Nor would
there be areawide expenditure ceilings. Investments in beds and/or
other facilities and services would not be monitored by planning
authorities. Empirical studies reveal that most of these regulatory
activities have not succeeded in reducing the growth of health care
costs. Yet, when they have succeeded in cost containment, there is
serious question whether undesirable side effects have not (or will
not) largely offset the beneficial effects on private and public
budgets.
Although a few elements of the competitive approach have
been put into practice in the last half decade or so and additional
ones are being given serious consideration, it is extremely doubtful
that a "let-er-rip" (LER) market-oriented approach will be politically viable in the foreseeable future. Likely opposition from both
provider and consumer groups, such as trade unions, has been discussed above as have possible ways of overcoming such opposition.
We do not wish to minimize political problems in implementing a
market-oriented approach; certainly our concept of the market differs substantially from that traditionally espoused by provider
groups. But even if LER were possible, would it be desirable to
adopt a full-scale market-oriented approach at this time? A gradualist approach would be preferable to LER.
There is now plenty of empirical evidence documenting the
failures of most forms of regulation in the health field. But although we find the market-oriented approach conceptually appealing, many of the reforms currently being considered are based primarily on knowledge of how markets function but with little
empirical underpinning. Furthermore, there are a number of prac-
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tical implementation questions that arise when one moves from the
abstract concept to actual implementation of a program. There is a
danger of repeating a major error of the past-program implementation on a national basis without either prior empirical evidence
on program effectiveness, or without sufficient attention to complex implementation issues. For this reason, there should be experimentation with a variety of market-oriented approaches on a
small scale. Outcomes should be evaluated, and practical implementation problems that arise documented.
We realize that it would take years before the results of such
studies would be available. But it is unlikely that the LER approach can be implemented on a national basis within the next few
years in any event. More feasible in the short run than LER is
reform of Medicare and Medicaid and of existing federal tax subsidies for private health insurance. We strongly favor introducing
market-oriented incentives into the private health insurance market, and the same applies to existing public programs of health
care financing with the proviso that they apply to Medicare as well
as to Medicaid. Applied to Medicaid patients alone, competitive
reforms could be misinterpreted as inevitably disadvantaging lowincome groups. Inclusion of Medicare, which covers the full socioeconomic spectrum, would avoid any possibility of misperception
about class bias in the market-oriented reform approach. Moreover, on programmatic grounds, Medicaid's market share is typically too small to have a meaningful influence on decisions of private sector providers. Further, federal involvement in Medicare is
much more substantial than it is in Medicaid, which is a federalstate financial and administrative partnership. Thus, at the federal
level, it would seem appropriate and desirable to include Medicare
with Medicaid reform.
At the state level, of course, Medicaid reform alone may well
be justified because states have no financial involvement in Medicare while they have a substantial fiscal stake in Medicaid. In addition, states can serve as laboratories for experimentation as part of
the gradualist approach we endorse. Consequently, our appeal for
inclusion of Medicare with reform of Medicaid applies to formulation of federal policy; states should be free to experiment with incentives approaches to Medicaid.

